

# EuroMeSCo Annual Report 2006

Regaining Impetus

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## **EuroMeSCo Annual Report 2006.01**

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Chronology of Main Events in the Euro-Mediterranean Area

EuroMeSCo Main Activities

## Preliminary Remarks

The aim of this report is to present key conclusions extracted from the EuroMeSCo 2006 projects. The first chapter, drafted by Álvaro de Vasconcelos and Abdallah Saaf, is based on EuroMeSCo's work throughout the first year of its research programme under the current contract with the European Commission and aims at discussing some of the most important political developments that affected the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and thus the Euro-Mediterranean area in 2006.

This analysis provides the starting point for a reflection of the EMP's priorities in 2007 and prepares the ground for the second chapter, drafted by Maria do Rosário de Moraes Vaz with the support of André Barrinha, that summarises the key issues that were debated at the EuroMeSCo Annual Conference in Istanbul (5-7 October 2006). This chapter is guided by the debates that took place in the Annual Conference's six working groups and touches upon the conclusions and comments made by their moderators and rapporteurs, i.e. Denis Bauchard, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Roberto Aliboni, Thanos Dokos, Mustapha Hamarneh, Senén Florensa, Lotfi Boumghar, Alima Boumediène-Thiery, Tuomo Melasuo, Fifi Benaboud and Latifa El Bouhsini.

The third chapter, drafted by Tobias Schumacher, intends to give an overview, as well as a summary, of all EuroMeSCo research projects conducted in 2006 and concludes with concrete policy recommendations for the nowadays 37 EMP partners.

The report concludes with a presentation of all research teams involved in EuroMeSCo's research work in 2006, a chronology of events in the Euro-Mediterranean area, and an overview of all EuroMeSCo publications and activities.

This report summarises, and in a way unites, the four EuroMeSCo Annual Reports on benchmarking, women as full participants in the Euro-Mediterranean Community of democratic states, and the cartoons crisis that are published separately.

## 1. Regaining Impetus

The Euro-Mediterranean area was affected by serious crises during the first year since the Barcelona Summit, which coincided with the first year of the current EuroMeSCo programme. There was the war in Lebanon, conflict in Palestine, and the majority of the southern countries were in the throes of political transformations, of varying importance and differing extent, that have highlighted the weight and influence of new political actors.

The consequences of the tragedy in Iraq with the outbreak of civil war also became clear in 2006, as did the concomitant rise of Iran as a regional player with a capacity to exert significant influence over some Arab League countries. 2006 was the year in which the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) began to gradually implement the Barcelona II programme, but was also the year of the “cartoons crisis”, which revealed the popularity of “culturalist” theories and the climate of mutual ignorance pervaded segments of society on both sides of the Mediterranean.

Equally, it was in 2006 that the European Union (EU), unable to emerge from the constitutional crisis, sent rather negative signals regarding Turkey’s accession. That process is being observed with the greatest of interest by the citizens of the southern Mediterranean countries, who regard that process as a decisive test of the future of a potential democratic Euro-Mediterranean integration. The failure of a militarised unilateralist project – to which most Americans are now opposed – also became clear because of the aggravation of the situation in Iraq and the war in Lebanon.

Long-term multilateral projects – such as the EMP – are all the more urgent now that unilateralism has failed, and the favourable conditions for their development must be pursued. In this context, it is necessary to assess the Partnership a year after Barcelona 2005, to understand the great challenges facing the region.

In the light of EuroMeSCo’s research work in 2006 and the discussions held, notably on the occasion of the Annual Conference (Istanbul, 5-7 October, 2006), it seems necessary to clarify nine key issues in order to determine which should be the EMP’s priorities in 2007, a year that unfortunately promises to be as troubled as its predecessor.

### 1.1. Barcelona II Failed to Meet Expectations but Put Democracy at the Centre of the Debate

Many believed that the Barcelona Summit, held ten years after the launching of the Partnership, would re-launch the Euro-Mediterranean process. Yet, this did not happen. The impact of and main conclusions reached at the Summit must be examined in light of the profound changes suffered by the Euro-Mediterranean region since the 1995 Summit, most notably those caused by the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and by the fallout of the war in Iraq.

The 2005 Summit took place seven months after Syria finally left Lebanon, and five months after the Lebanese elections and with the electoral process in Palestine in full swing. It occurred when the Moroccan Truth and Equity Commission was debating human rights violations under the previous monarch. At that time, the central issue was not how to ensure stability and development but rather how to promote political reform. Since then, the issue of democracy has become unavoidable. Southern Mediterranean societies are, for the most part, undergoing a period of intense debate about political reform, liberalisation and democratisation.

During the year that preceded the Summit, lively interest was expressed and expectations were generated about the event, which also gave impetus to the participation of the most varied social sectors, notably from civil society, in the preparatory phase of the summit. The most positive aspect of the Summit was probably the preparatory process and the participatory impetus it generated. The positive welcome of the EuroMeSCo Report *Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States* by many different sectors suggests that it is possible to generate a consensus around the goal of building a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States. The Summit was marred by a significant number of absentee states, and there was no debate on the kinds of measures that might lead to the establishment of such a Community.

Among the key themes of the Barcelona Process are democracy and human rights, vital issues throughout the region. Despite strong opposition, the importance of Islamist movements has become self-evident, and their integration into the political arena is essential if any progress is to be achieved with democratisation. These movements are becoming more responsible, and some of them are democratic Islamist parties. Given this evolution, the term "Islamist" may no longer be pertinent, as it covers groups that are too heterogeneous to bear a single label.

There has been some positive progress with the new working programme determined at the Summit, but there was a loss of impetus during the course of 2006. The conflicts affecting two members of the EMP – Lebanon and Palestine (in the latter the free election of Hamas and the boycott against it) – both sowed doubt about the true commitment to democratisation of some EMP actors. Democratisation is necessarily a long term process and one which has no alternative. It is necessary to capitalise on the human and political effort that has been put into the summit and carry out the programme that was actually agreed to.

**It is essential that the intellectual capital and network relations established with the preparation of the Summit are taken advantage of in 2007, and that the goal of creating a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States continues to be pursued.**

**Southern Mediterranean societies are, for the most part, undergoing a period of intense debate about political reform, liberalisation and democratisation.**

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## **1.2. The Cartoons Crisis and the Popularity of Cultural Relativism**

The spread of various theories that serve to justify discriminatory policies and behaviour and intolerance in the north and south was patently clear in 2006. The most popular of these theories, which gained particular prominence after the cartoons crisis, was the “cultural relativist” position, notably following the Huntingtonian view that Islam is incompatible with democracy and – for some – even rationality.

These theories amalgamate the most diverse categories, most notably tradition, civilisation and culture. The issue of discrimination and the rejection of the “Other” is not just a problem in Europe but also in the South where there is religious intolerance against people of other faiths but mostly against non-believers. The credibility that various political actors lend these theories and, what is worse, the political use that is made of them, has contributed to the spread of xenophobic attitudes and real political challenges.

It is necessary to respond to discriminatory theories and rhetoric, ideological and political debate is the best alternative to extremism. It is vitally important to deconstruct reductionist theories of Islam that only serve to focus all attention on minority extremist currents preaching violence and obscurantism. It is necessary to show how the rationalist current in Islamic thought, both traditional and modern, is dense. The same rationalist reference is also found in the practical discourse, apparent in day to day life, and emphasizes the notion of what is reasonable.

Where philosophy and theology are concerned, it is not solely a question of unravelling philosophy and theology to uncover utopian or other kind of references to the Golden Age in Ibn Rushd (Averroès) or other Arab Islamist Hellenists; it is also a question of undertaking practical and current research. This does not mean that one fails to recognise that one of the most serious problems in the modern world – the main alternative to the democratic project in fact – is identity-based nationalism, especially the kind that manipulates religious feeling for political purposes.

No religion was spared by the use of political violence, sometimes of the greatest brutality. Despite degraded images of “us” and “them” within Euro-Mediterranean countries, increasing pluralism – be it political, within civil society, or in the media – has created the conditions for a positive political and ideological response. It is possible to engage in a critique of the political manipulation of religious feelings, or for a regional appeal to a rational approach to defending secularism and free speech and to combating intolerance.

During the cartoons crisis some of the print media in the south debated the political rather than the cultural or religious meaning of the crisis. Anti-semitic initiatives such as that adopted by the Iranian President after the cartoons crisis cannot pass without comment as they represent a threat to the development of a universal consensus about the Holocaust and genocide, both of which are essential elements of any shared human rights policy.

**Islamophobia, anti-semitism, and anti-Christian sentiments are all manifestations of identity-based nationalism, which is the greatest threat to the Barcelona ideals of democratisation and inclusion. The political and ideological battle against intolerance and discrimination and the defence of fundamental values, such as the right to diversity and free speech, must be a political priority of the Partnership in 2007.**

### **1.3. From Failed Militarised Unilateralism to Effective Multilateralism**

2006 heralded the collapse of unilateralism, particularly of the military variety. The failure of the US intervention in Iraq has become quite obvious, as the country descended into civil war, as has the failure of the Israeli attack on Lebanon. Further, it became clear how important it is to have ongoing and effective diplomatic action to resolve the Palestinian question. After the Iraq war started expectations about the international role of the EU increased significantly, and the idea that the Union is necessary to help establish a multilateral international system became more compelling.

The debate on the constitutional project and the different positions adopted on the subject, namely the rejection of the Constitution, had a direct impact on Euro-Mediterranean relations. EU institutions are still not able to act effectively and coherently to resolve regional crises, such as those involving Palestine and Lebanon. Despite the importance of the European military contingent in the south of Lebanon, there were no durable and effective parallel diplomatic actions.

With the failure of unilateralism confirmed, and US democracy and human rights promotion policies discredited, European “inclusion” by small incremental steps began to appear more compelling. But, in response to the Union’s impotence in Palestine and Lebanon, in 2006 scepticism about the ability of the Union to rise to the occasion grew unabated.

**The failure of unilateralism has created a window of opportunity that must not be lost. Multilateral frameworks, such as the EMP must be strengthened. But for this to happen, the EU and its southern partners must develop the capacity to act decisively to resolve the problems affecting the region. In other words, they must practice effective multilateralism.**

### **1.4. From Turkish Hopes to Current Troubles**

The promise of Turkish accession to the Union was renewed in 2006. The Union emerged clearly as the embodiment of a major strategic project able to integrate countries with a Muslim majority like Turkey. Southern analysts emphasised the

integration – democratic transformation – diversity triangle as being at the heart of the European process of integration and as the necessary pillars of a shared project. The media in the southern countries, such as the very popular *Al Jazeera*, reported extensively on the initiation of negotiations. The Turkish example was a confirmation that a transition to democracy was possible; and it was a confirmation that the option to democratise increases the international standing of a country.

The Turkish accession process confirmed that integration in a shared space with the EU was actually possible, that the Union was refusing to adopt a civilisational view and to create a Western Club, and was instead open to a process in which Muslims could be active partners. Twelve months on, the reservations, obstacles and difficulties have multiplied. The image of Turkey rejected, however inaccurate it may be, has become dominant. It must be made very clear that domestic politics in the Union powerfully shape its outer face, and the ability of the Union to ensure the survival of its cohesion model of democratic diversity will depend largely on its transformative power of attraction vis-à-vis its neighbours. This is why Turkey is such a decisive test.

**The Turkish accession process confirmed that integration in a shared space with the EU was actually possible, that the Union was refusing to adopt a civilisational view and to create a Western Club, and was instead open to a process in which Muslims could be active partners.**

**It is necessary to take into account the repercussions of both the denial and acceptance of Turkish accession for the Mediterranean – and for the EMP. Declarations made for short term electoral gains must be avoided as they can have long term negative effects.**

### **1.5. Immigrants as Partnership Actors**

A central issue in Euro-Mediterranean relations in 2006 was that of immigration, a topic that was addressed increasingly in a positive as well as global and multifaceted way from 2005 onwards, although still far from the approach recommended by the EuroMeSCo Report *Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States*, notably as regards migrants and their descendants and the proposal that they should not be viewed from a security perspective and as a problem, but rather as central actors in the process of economic and political integration of both regions.

The human dramas that unfolded in Ceuta and the Canary Islands in 2006 showed the true face of the southern Mediterranean countries as transit countries for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. Broadly speaking, policy in 2006 was about containing migration flows through the reinforcement of border controls. It was felt that security measures were insufficient by themselves, and that it was necessary to get at the root of the problem by increasing development aid to sub-Saharan Africa. Immigration is still viewed, above all, as a problem and not as a key factor of economic development for Europe and its neighbours, or as a fundamental human element in Euro-Mediterranean relations.

The value of the political, social and economic networks established with emigration/immigration must be recognised, as they are a key factor of Euro-Mediterranean inclusion as shown by the various studies published and debates held by EuroMeSCo in 2006. Anti-immigrant policies are an obstacle to achieve such recognition. It is necessary to develop a Barcelona Plus or, put differently, a Euro-Mediterranean process that is compatible with the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in which the free movement of people is part and parcel of relations between the north and south of the Mediterranean.

**The 2007 Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial on migration under the Portuguese Presidency of the EU provides an opportunity to turn migrants into full actors in Euro-Mediterranean relations in political as well as social and economic terms. The adoption of a Euro-Mediterranean Charter of Rights of Migrants should be a central goal of the Partnership as recommended at the EuroMeSCo Annual Conference.**

## **1.6. Recognising Civil Society as an Actor**

One of the most innovative aspects of the EMP is the role attributed within it to civil society despite all the limitations imposed on civil societies in some countries. There was recognition of civil society as a Partnership actor in 2006, particularly evident with the new prominence of the Euromed Non-Governmental Platform in various Euro-Mediterranean initiatives.

Civil societies in the southern Mediterranean countries have also forged a place in the public debate, affirming their place as essential elements in processes of political transformation, although it is still too early to assess their real impact on decision-making processes. The idea that civil society is non-existent on the southern banks of the Mediterranean has been proved wrong.

The regional seminar on human rights organised by EuroMeSCo and held in the Moroccan city of Meknès in the summer of 2006 showed just how vital civil society is. This was a civil society with a diversified agenda that, beyond its role as denouncer of ills, was also actively proposing measures and policies in specific domains such as justice, human rights, women's rights, or the rights of migrants and freedom of speech.

However, the emergence of civil society as a Partnership actor and beyond has been accompanied by the attempts of some states to interfere with the designation of civil society representatives.

**It is necessary for all states to understand that civil society is essential if all countries are to take full advantage of the potential benefits of globalisation and if political reform is to succeed and the transition to democracy is to be a gradual and peaceful process.**

**“Islamist women’s organisations are now an undeniable part of the growing movement for gender equality in the South...; there are obviously differences between Islamist women’s organisations and their secular counterparts ... but there are elements of consensus as far as the public rights of women are concerned.”**

*EuroMeSCo Report Women as Full Participants in the Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States*

It is necessary for all states to understand that civil society is essential if all countries are to take full advantage of the potential benefits of globalisation and if political reform is to succeed and the transition to democracy is to be a gradual and peaceful process. For this it is necessary to open the public sphere and the Partnership sphere to all sectors of civil society without ideological reservations.

This means refusing all politically restricted definitions of civil society, including that withdrawn from the 2005 Summit document, which stated that civil society was defined “in accordance with national legislation” when in some countries the definition is such that it limits the emergence and development of autonomous organisations. At the same time, it is also necessary for civil society initiatives undertaken under the aegis of the Partnership that they extend beyond the limited definitions of the term, and become more pluralistic.

**As stated in the EuroMeSCo Report *Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States*, it is necessary that cooperation be established between those who are different, and not just those who are similar. Clearly, only a bottom-up approach and only the acceptance of diversity, including of organisations with a religious bent, will make it possible for the Partnership to take advantage of one of its most interesting characteristics, namely its involvement with civil society. Only in this way will civil society be able to transcend recognition and start to have real influence.**

### **1.7. Partial Progress and Methodological Success**

Looking over a year’s implementation of the 2005 Barcelona Summit Working Programme it is possible to conclude that many obstacles deter further political progress, as was indeed the case during the first ten years of the Partnership. Deepening crises in the eastern Mediterranean impeded a consensus to launch new projects or to implement some of the programme initiatives adopted at the Summit on security and human rights.

However, the innovative nature of the five-year programme and its “community dynamic” were obvious throughout 2006, as exemplified by the Ministerial Conference on “The Reinforcement of the Role of Women in Society” held under the Finnish Presidency. Civil society groups and the various networks established within the framework of the Partnership, including EuroMeSCo, FEMISE and the Anna Lindh Foundation, were involved in the preparation of the conference, which gave continuity to the method used throughout the preparatory stage of the Summit. This was vital to unblocking the impasse in the debate.

The Ministerial Conference on women's rights failed to adopt many of the proposals put forward in the EuroMeSCo Report *Women as Full Participants in a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States* prepared for the occasion, most notably on the need to set concrete and measurable goals, and on the creation of a follow-up mechanism. The ministers, however, adopted a framework for action in the domain of women's rights that is to be implemented over the next five years, and they proposed that a meeting of Euro-Mediterranean experts should be convened once a year to evaluate progress.

**The Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Women's Rights and the preparatory method used are good examples of the way to move forward with issues that are essential for Euro-Mediterranean inclusion. This method should be used again in 2007 to implement initiatives in other domains in the framework of the EMP, notably in preparing the Ministerial Conference on Migration.**

## **1.8. The European Neighbourhood Policy and Euro-Mediterranean Inclusion**

For the Union, the Barcelona Process is about extending southward the process of democratic inclusion (short of membership) that is the basis of the European integration project. Democratic inclusion is necessarily a long term goal, which requires well-defined, promotional and supportive policies if it is to succeed. A true system of benchmarking should be introduced and an annual assessment of progress undertaken. Each state should have its own established measure of progress and reform pace. Partner states that are most willing and able to join the Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States should not be held back by their more hesitant counterparts.

The potential benefits of Europe's neighbourhood policy are that it differentiates countries positively, and that it can contribute to the goals of the Barcelona Process by strengthening the multilateral dimension. Its success depends on the attitude of southern countries and the ambitions of the European Union.

The attitude of southern Mediterranean countries toward the ENP varies a great deal at present, largely according to their degree of commitment to political liberalisation and respect for basic human rights. It was apparent throughout 2006 that the Union still needs to clarify its ultimate goals. Substantial means are necessary to implement the immense tasks of political and economic reform faced by the southern countries.

If it wants to succeed, the EU must promote the kind of political, social and economic cohesion policies that worked so well in the European context. To that end, it must harbour similar ambitions for the southern Mediterranean that it had for its eastern neighbours as progress is made. The creation of a free trade zone without social policies is condemned to fail. In order for the ENP to become more effective and credible, it needs to adopt a true system of intelligent benchmarking that is based on commonly accepted and clear definitions of the issues at stake, as well as on a regular monitoring mechanism. Moreover, greater clarity is needed among all partners as regards the final direction of the entire ENP.

**The ENP has not emerged in 2006 as a mobilising political project. It is essential to clarify the goals of Europe's neighbourhood policy and its relationship with the Barcelona Process, as well as the means available to promote political and economic reform policies.**

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### **1.9. 2006: A Year of Wars and Tensions**

2006 was a year charged with conflict, a very difficult year for the Euro-Mediterranean area. The logic of militarised unilateralism prevailed over diplomacy in the Middle East. The war in Lebanon, as well as conflicts in Gaza, the West Bank and the Mashreq area confirmed that a culture of force persists among the members of the Partnership, which only serves to radicalise the Middle East. The Partnership cannot ignore the consequences of the grave situation in the eastern Mediterranean.

The Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference allowed for a frank discussion of the use of force, but no significant political or security decisions were adopted. Euro-Mediterranean inclusion was seriously affected by the wars and deep crises in the Middle East. There was no progress in resolving other regional tensions that have lasted decades, such as the issue of the Western Sahara or that of Cyprus, which proved to be serious obstacles for the process of Euro-Mediterranean inclusion. The conflict in the Western Sahara continues to undermine the potential Maghreb integration project as well as the Euro-Mediterranean free trade zone project.

In the absence of multilateral or regional diplomatic initiatives, unilateralism prevailed, and it is at the root of the lack of progress or, in the best of cases, of uncertainty about results. The same can be said about the Cyprus issue which has a negative impact on the process of Turkish accession to the EU. The non-resolution of these conflicts, which weighed heavily on the Partnership, made it impossible to move forward with Euro-Mediterranean inclusion.

The Barcelona Process is not the framework within which conflicts such as these can be resolved, but it must be the framework within which a security culture is developed which complies with the principles established by the Barcelona Declaration and the international conventions signed by the partner states. It is not possible to construct

a Euro-Mediterranean democratic region without de-legitimising power politics and militarised unilateralism.

**There must be a serious debate within the Partnership about the security culture and relevant guiding international principles, so that this culture abides by Barcelona principles. The ultimate goal is the elaboration of a Euro-Mediterranean declaration of principles, which calls for the use of force only as a last resort and scrupulously respecting international law.**

**The Barcelona Process must develop a security culture that embodies the principles of the Barcelona Declaration and the international conventions governing the use of military force.**



## 2. EuroMeSCo Annual Conference Highlights

The EuroMeSCo Annual Conference which convened in Istanbul in early October 2006 started off in much the same vein as it ended after two days of intense and occasionally heated debate: the need to overcome the “new divide” arising from the “culturalist paradigm” that has lately tended to dominate the political discourse in a variety of issues concerning the Mediterranean and the concomitant obscuring of politics. This pervasive cultural reductionism – which paradoxically overshadows the vibrancy and plurality of cultures – ignores the internal dynamics of European and Mediterranean societies and sets in stone a sort of revisited bipolar logic that stresses confrontation over similarity or cooperation.

The principal aim of the conference was to investigate the changing reality within both regions and contribute to a better understanding of those changes and the best way to help them stay the right course. In the southern Mediterranean, the dynamics of reform and the spate of elections – in Palestine or the Lebanon, in Egypt or in Morocco – are contributing to the (re)emergence of old and new political parties and movements. In Europe, still at grips with absorbing its own expansion, mounting xenophobia including in countries which traditionally champion the Mediterranean, is also introducing factors of change powerfully effecting Euro-Mediterranean relations.

North and South, the ‘new agenda’ is thus perhaps unsurprisingly the same: its main common points remain democracy, individual rights and freedoms, and the empowerment of civil society. The ‘traditional agenda’, more clearly security- than democracy-driven, can sadly not be discarded as obsolete, however. War in the Lebanon and a further deterioration of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are proof of its enduring prevalence. In this light, the issue of the values and the rules governing the use of force particularly where the resolution of disputes within a cooperative processes such as the EMP is concerned, as well as the establishment of a positive correlation between security and justice, including in the fight against terrorism, are issues of particular import.

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### 2.1. Whither Europe? Whither Turkey?

In the current atmosphere of malaise and disillusionment prevailing in Europe, the answer to these two questions is closely intertwined. There is no denying that Turkey’s accession prospects have been cast in a dimmer light after the ‘No-No’ popular vote against the European Constitution which has further complexified intra-European relationships and clouded the political climate across the Union. The present European crisis can partly be explained by its rapid expansion in the absence of commensurate institutional adaptation, compounded by the parallel demands of adapting to globalisation. Growth pains have added to the lack of confidence generated among Europeans towards EU institutions. Restoring confidence requires

a swift response to the concerns, anxieties and fears of European citizens, whose demand for a 'better Europe', on the strength of the perceived constraints imposed on national states and their resulting inability to face global problems individually, has not abated.

The view that the EU's clouded atmosphere should not be allowed to stall, and under no circumstances *de facto* reject, Turkey's accession was not seriously disputed, although the recommended dosage of patience for the ten or fifteen years ahead varied according to the speaker. Equally consensual was the view that Turkey belongs to Europe, for reasons grounded on a wealth of historical, geo-strategic and political factors which were extensively detailed. Nevertheless, European public opinion feels a certain degree of hostility towards Turkey's membership, and there is no denying this is rooted in a wider sentiment of rejection of the Muslim world – which is not without reciprocation – and arises mainly from mutual misperceptions and misconceptions.

There is no way these issues can be addressed other than through relentless dialogue and informed exchanges at all levels, and more broadly the future of the Euro-Mediterranean space depends on precisely the same recipe. A pre-condition for the successful outcome of Euro-Mediterranean initiatives such as the EMP, is that the EU does not sway from the defence – and the strict compliance with – such truly universal principles as democracy and respect for human rights while abstaining from displaying any kind of arrogance in this regard. The EU has a wealth of experience which can usefully be shared with, but never imposed to, its southern Mediterranean neighbours, and the potential of the Barcelona Process in this regard has yet to be fully exploited.

## **2.2. What are the Prospects for a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States?**

If progress towards the stated goals of the Barcelona Process is to be constructively evaluated by governments and societies alike, then agreed criteria to measure progress have to be set in place. A benchmarking system for the political and security chapter of the EMP was proposed, prioritising human rights and democracy. Main indicators cover eight key areas: formal commitment to human rights; right to physical integrity; political participation; rule of law; civil liberties; civil society; women's empowerment and rights; migrants' and minority rights. Benchmarking must be used as a self-help tool, however, if it is to be accepted by all stakeholders concerned, which must include state institutions and, crucially, civil societies.

Democracy and inclusion should indeed be the motto presiding over all kinds of relationships within and between Euro-Mediterranean countries, and this in turn requires that neighbourly relations built on understanding, not confrontation, be the rule as far each individual member of the EMP is concerned. Inclusiveness is antithetic to isolation of national and sub-national communities alike.

Finally, the emergence of a Community – a step ahead of the looser grouping denoted by the term ‘association’ – of Democratic States “encompassing all of the Mediterranean” was considered to be the most desirable outcome of the Barcelona Process initiated in 1995. Hopes were then high which had not been fulfilled in many areas where, in spite of the slow tempo required by transformation processes, it would indeed have been possible. Such is the case with the abandonment of the use of force to resolve contentious issues within the region. Despite many shortfalls that could have been avoided, striving towards creating a Community of Democratic States “remains the most promising path,” and one to which EU presidencies in particular should lend strong and decisive support so that the full development of such a community will sooner than later become a reality.

### **2.3. Political and Democratic Reform: “Rendering unto Caesar...”**

**Democracy and inclusion should indeed be the motto presiding over all kinds of relationships within and between Euro-Mediterranean countries, and this in turn requires that neighbourly relations built on understanding, not confrontation, be the rule.**

The debate on democratic reform focused on Morocco and Egypt, and was dominated by the issue of ‘political devolution’ – in other words, “rendering unto politics the things that belong to politics,” and ensuring all political forces namely those with Islamic leanings and the liberal reformists are part of the public space.

Political parties which define themselves as national parties based on Islamic roots are rising in public spaces that are limited by the same types of constraints in monarchies and republics alike. These constraints relate to the discretionary powers of heads of state, and to the reality of a far less pluralistic environment than the constitutionally accepted multiparty systems portray. The increasing power of state-controlled religious establishments, in some cases, further narrows the political space. Blocked political systems and political parties must shoulder the blame for a general political reality in which citizens do not feel their voices heard, and are thus ultimately alienated from political participation. Illiteracy and poor standards of education, and the lack of a tradition of public debate, contribute to this pattern of estrangement.

Meaningful political reforms necessitate strong political parties with clearly-defined political projects, capable of assuming their functions and responsibilities. This is a precondition for the accountability of government, as opposed to stale bureaucracies with no clear sense of purpose which give politics a bad name. The extent to which parties and movements with Islamic leanings participate in the political sphere varies widely from country to country, and in many cases they are already major players.

Strong political parties accountable to the people can hardly be expected to develop or to survive, on the other hand, when regimes consistently impede free elections and stifle political debate, thereby causing political and social tensions to be transferred to other spheres of society. This deliberate eroding of the political arena will play into the hands of those who are able to manage that transfer process, and thus in effect take control of spheres of society, from education to public health, and in effect

assume roles which should be the preserve of public policies. As a consequence, religious institutions with a conservative agenda, whether or not they are controlled by the state, are being allowed to acquire a degree of societal influence which vastly exceeds their remit and, moreover, can not be challenged by political forces. There is thus little benefit to be derived from the whole debate on political reform until politics regains its rightful place in society.

The notion of “new political actors” when it comes to political forces with Islamic roots was clarified during the debate. Although most Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, have long been active, they have developed a new strategy in the sense of clearly affirming themselves as political parties and accepting the rules of the political game as defined by the state.

The issue of the role of external actors in promoting – and in some cases demoting – political reform was also debated. Most participants felt the United States, after the catastrophic blunder in Iraq, was again reverting to the preference for stability over democracy as far at least as the main US allies in the region were concerned, thus catering to the interests of regimes whose foremost concern is their own survival. This bodes ill for restoring the debate on reform and modernisation to where it belongs: the public political arena.

What room is there then for a recognisably European stance that would distance itself from Washington's? The first point to be stressed is that the issue of political reform currently features high on the EU's agenda, which has not always been the case when it comes to Europe's Mediterranean initiatives. Whether the instruments set in place to help make it happen, notably the ENP's action plans and the Euro-Mediterranean meetings at various levels – which constitute the backbone of the institutionalised relationship between the EU and southern Mediterranean partners – are well suited to promote this shared goal, however, is another matter. Caution should be exercised, particularly on the part of the European Commission, in order to keep the EMP from being entirely submerged by the ENP's fragmenting bilateralism. Concerns for stability on the part of the EU, on the other hand, are certainly not absent, often tied to the pervasive and ever-growing security agenda. If Europe wants to have a decisive role in democracy promotion, its dialogue initiatives must then be all-inclusive so as to involve all trends present in societies, namely moderate islamists.

**The issue of political reform currently features high on the EU's agenda, which has not always been the case when it comes to Europe's Mediterranean initiatives.**

## **2.4. Measuring Progress towards Democratic Development**

The outcome and the pace of political reform in the south is primarily the result of the interplay between political actors operating in the domestic scene, upon which the influence of external actors is then exerted. Ruling elites largely define the public space by their quasi-monopoly on means of coercion and resources, e.g. media control and access; Islamist challengers carve their political role also from

outside the political arena, by using the extensive network of mosques as a base to undermine the legitimacy of ruling elites by highlighting corruption, ineptitude in addressing social ills, and catering to foreign interests; the democrats, relative newcomers in many countries, are thus forced to literal confinement, vulnerable to the arbitrariness of the state and lacking the means and space to promote their political agenda. The credibility of either the EU or the United States to act in the region is undermined by their use of double standards. Rivalry between them, and especially the lack of consistency between reform goals and instruments and tactics to promote them, also affects their ability to shape or influence reform agendas. In monitoring progress, temptations to “reinvent the wheel” should be resisted: many suitable indicators exist (including in the UNDP’s *Arab Development Report*) that can usefully help address the shortcomings of democratic reform. The main issue is rather one of recognition, notably in the case of the EU. Domestic actors must be confident that respect for human rights, the rule of law and internationally-monitored free and fair elections will indeed be rewarded through aid and trade. Consistency between stated aims and strategies, clarity of vision and the rejection of unilateralist actions as well as the use of force are crucial to the ability of the main external players to bolster democratic reform prospects in the region.

**Domestic actors must be confident that respect for human rights, the rule of law and internationally-monitored free and fair elections will indeed be rewarded through aid and trade.**

## **2.5. Use of Force, Democracy and International Law**

Quite apart from any moral or legal considerations, the appalling results of recent attempts at using military force in trying to force political change – whether in Lebanon or in Iraq – prove its utter inadequacy beyond doubt. Both cases demonstrate that the opposite outcomes to the desired ones have indeed resulted from military action, in the form of the severe deterioration of citizens’ and international security, without necessarily improving the political context. From these two cases, the international community should learn that the use of force is simply not an appropriate instrument to promote or to bolster democratic change. Aside from empirical considerations, on the other hand, there was a consensus as to the inherent contradiction of using force to impose democracy, which is essentially but another name for freedom of choice. Whilst some contended that force can only be countered by force, the legitimacy of any kind of response therefore being derived solely by the mere existence of an attack – in other words, conferred by the perpetrator of such an attack and not by norm or self-legitimation – most agreed that blanket justifications including the ‘global war on terror’ should not supersede considerations of domestic and international legality, and that states were still ill-equipped to deal with conflict involving non-state actors which require more complex responses than the mere use of military force even in those cases where it would be legitimate under international law. The license to brand political opponents as “terrorists” which operates in the domestic and the international sphere with equally destructive consequences, on the other hand, should in no case distract state actors from the basic truth that the fight against terrorism has to be firmly grounded in justice and legality.

Although inadequate and inherently inconsistent as an instrument to promote democratic change, there is nevertheless a case to be made for the legitimacy as well as the necessity of the use of force to uphold international law. The instances where the use of military force under international law can legitimately be contemplated, particularly in those cases of massive violation of human rights, were dealt with in detail, and the obsolescence of article 2.4 of the UN Charter, which sanctifies territorial integrity, was highlighted in this regard.

Resolving persisting conflicts requires a resolute option for political negotiation and the equally resolute abandonment of unilateral or military solutions. Democracy must be the future of the whole Euro-Mediterranean area, and in particular the future of Palestine. This cannot be achieved under occupation. The daily lot of humiliation and violence inflicted on the Palestinians (there are over 500 hundred military checkpoints dotting their land) cannot exculpate the mismanagement and corruption that have undermined the Palestinian Authority, and eventually placed Hamas in power, nor cannot it legitimise the latter's actions against Arab unity and in defiance of international law with a damaging effect to the Palestinian cause. Cutting off support to the administration, however, will neither counter the adverse effects of occupation nor contribute to increased transparency and efficiency, thereby contradicting Europe's own efforts towards the creation of a viable, democratic Palestinian state.

## **2.6. Unresolved Crises**

It is hardly surprising that only a few weeks after a military conflict had caused so much death and destruction, the war in Lebanon should have dominated the discussions on current crises affecting the Euro-Mediterranean area. It is more surprising that they should have been insufficiently tempered by self-criticism and a corresponding degree of empathy. By and large, however, it is possible to note a near consensus on the absolute need to find non-military solutions to existing conflicts. Sought unilaterally, attempts at a military solution to ongoing disputes are not only practically ineffective but morally unacceptable. Moderates and extremists are to be found on all sides of crises currently plaguing the region; a lasting and fair resolution to those crises will inevitably include bolstering and supporting the moderate forces, often the less vocal and less powerful domestically and regionally. Regional crises, on the other hand, will not be resolved without the involvement of all concerned players, e.g. Syria must not be excluded from international negotiations concerning Lebanon. Similarly, Iran cannot be discarded as a relevant player in the region's larger security equation. The passivity of the EU, absorbed by the implementation of the untested Neighbourhood Policy, and slowed by the concomitant effects of enlargement fatigue and constitutional crisis, which limit its capacity for meaningful involvement in the Middle East, was deplored by many. Equally, the need for the

**“La démocratie ne peut être, en aucun cas, affaire de guerre ni de croisades, aucun changement ne peut être imposé unilatéralement. Prôner cette démocratie implique ... que l’on s’interdise de disqualifier d’avance ou a posteriori les choix des peuples dont nous savons qu’ils n’ont pas connu, pendant des décennies, de liberté politique réelle.”**

Jorge Sampaio,  
Former President of Portugal

successor force to UNIFIL to be backed by some kind of wider political vision, or else find itself at risk of falling hostage to any of the regional powers was also a point of general agreement.

## **2.7. Justice as a Tool in the Fight against Terrorism**

Terrorism can not be effectively or legitimately combated outside the strict boundaries of justice. The search for common definitions of terrorism is of little practical consequence. All should agree, however, in defining terrorist acts as criminal acts. The reliability of legal systems in combating terrorism has been compromised, however, especially in common-law systems, by anti-terror legislation which in effect abandons basic principles and due process (e.g. the absolute rejection of torture, which contravenes, furthermore, international obligations) in favour of unproven security gains. The global 'war on terrorism' – an expression that should be abandoned altogether – has reinforced a security-driven agenda which creates a hostile environment to democratisation. EU attempts at democracy promotion are negatively affected by the blind eye turned on security mechanisms (e.g. perennial emergency laws, state security courts) that serve principally to perpetuate non-democratic regimes. Euro-Mediterranean cooperation should lead in time to the creation of a common juridical order in the region characterised by its firm grounding on and consequent strengthening of the rule of law.

**The passivity of the EU, absorbed by the implementation of the untested Neighbourhood Policy, and slowed by the concomitant effects of enlargement fatigue and constitutional crisis, which limit its capacity for meaningful involvement in the Middle East, was deplored by many.**

## **2.8. Putting Citizenship Rights at the Core of a Common Euro-Mediterranean Agenda**

A powerful warning on the perils of cultural relativism, an essentially paternalistic attitude, was followed by an appeal to a broader, less self-centred dialogue in order to move forward on the establishment of a common agenda endorsed by governments and especially civil societies. When addressing issues of diversity, cultural relativisation should carefully be avoided, for it is easy to fall into the trap laid by a discourse designed to implement a hidden political agenda under the guise of the protection of specific cultural rights. The temptation of falling back into imposing ill-suited models based on stereotypes should equally be avoided.

**Euro-Mediterranean cooperation should lead in time to the creation of a common juridical order in the region characterised by its firm grounding on and consequent strengthening of the rule of law.**

The EMP is often viewed as being less about sharing and more about imposing those issues like migration or security on which the EU appears to be keener. On the other hand, it has been largely incapable or unwilling to transcend the closed confines of inter-state relations. Without the involvement of civil society, without broad public debate, there can be no positive evolution of the Partnership towards shared goals and objectives. Openness, on the other hand, will not be complete if it does not extend to movements with Islamic leanings.



The wider issue of inclusiveness was addressed in its dual aspect of principled and practical necessity: Inclusion is doubtless a sound principle conducive to harmonious relations between states and peoples; but its absence will inevitably lead to conflict – not necessarily or even primarily between the West and Islam, but rather between the affluent and the deprived. The main fault-line is not the one pitching mythical civilisations on a clashing path, but rather the more down-to-earth, classical divide between rich and poor. The future must be one of social and civilisational inclusion, or there is no future at all.

## 2.9. Empowering Women

The Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference should be a starting point for women's empowerment to become more of a priority in southern countries' development and human rights agendas, and to perfect the instruments to monitor the gender-specific impact of Euro-Mediterranean programmes on the actual promotion of women's rights as a part of the larger civic, political and labour rights agenda. This might correct the prevailing perception that the EU's discourse is not always followed by a careful assessment of the adequacy of the instruments set in place, which is a cause for some frustration among southern civil societies. The recent reform of the *Mudawana* in Morocco served to illustrate the more general point that women's rights are an area where patriarch-dominated societies show greater resistance to change. Religious arguments, used with equal vigour by proponents and adversaries of conservatism, cannot entirely be averted in domestic debates. In the Euro-Mediterranean debate, however, women's empowerment must not be allowed to slip into a cultural and especially a religious dialogue of sorts; it must be addressed rather as an important element in the overall human rights, democracy and development promotion agenda. Formal commitment through adherence to international instruments is important. Much attention has to be paid to those mechanisms which guarantee substantive compliance with such standards, however, in Europe as well as in the South.

## 2.10. Looking Beyond the “Cartoons Row”

The so-called “cartoons row” was more the result of a clash of stereotypes than a symptom of a clash of cultures, where diversity predominates over uniformity. Reactions to the publication of a set of cartoons deemed insulting to the Prophet Muhammad (and by extension to Muslim communities in general) varied extensively in Europe and the South. Certain Christian and Jewish religious circles, for example, were as indignant as their most indignant Muslim counterparts. The host of issues revolving around freedom of expression, on the other hand, was often argued along similar lines by southern and northern commentators to deplore the far more negative consequences of its absence than of its occasional abuse. Freedom of expression

**The main fault-line is not the one pitching mythical civilisations on a clashing path, but rather the more down-to-earth, classical divide between rich and poor.**

**In the Euro-Mediterranean debate, women's empowerment must not be allowed to slip into a cultural and especially a religious dialogue of sorts; it must be addressed as an important element in the overall human rights, democracy and development promotion agenda.**



**Fair and unbiased reporting, on the other hand, are a more powerful tool than regulations to overcome misrepresentations and stereotypes.**

**While advocacy in issues related to mobility is important, the crucial role of NGOs and other institutions active within the EMP is to decouple between insecurity and migration in European public perceptions.**

may contend with the equally important right to freedom of conscience and religious belief. It is doubtful, however, whether this should lead to commonly agreed standards to reconcile the two by imposing limitations on freedom of expression. Furthermore, the point was made that certain groups aiming to cause confrontation and friction across the Euro-Mediterranean area will not hesitate to resort to religious provocation. This should be met with unemotional and serene reactions from politicians and commentators. Fair and unbiased reporting, on the other hand, is a more powerful tool than regulations to overcome misrepresentations and stereotypes. No religion can be ideologically labelled; no faith can be represented as breeding any particular kind of human and even less political behaviour. No individual or community in Europe or in the South should ever feel threatened because of their religion. This is a fundamental issue when dealing with migrant and minority rights.

### **2.11. Migrants' Right to "Citizenship of Residence"**

The simple definition of a migrant is someone living and working in a different country from that of birth and/or nationality, in other words someone who has not or has not yet become a citizen of a given country "of residence". The discussion of migrants' potential contribution to a Euro-Mediterranean regional community crucially involves the issues of civil, social and political rights in both the country of origin and the country of residence. In this light, discussions centred on the issue of the full body of rights foreign-born residents of the EU, who contribute their creativity and their hard work to the development of host countries, should enjoy. Consistency with its stated aims for a Euro-Mediterranean area of shared democratic development requires that the EU should develop the concept of "citizenship of residence" for foreign-born residents, and urgent action was recommended along these lines. Migrants are agents of cultural transformation, vitality and diversity in ageing European societies. Maximising their role in the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean community, by influencing political change in southern countries and weaving a pattern of multi-faceted people-to-people relations between north and south, requires full interaction with democratic political and societal transformation processes in European countries as a precondition. While advocacy in issues related to mobility (visas, restrictions to free movement of people across the EU) is important, the crucial role of NGOs and other institutions active within the EMP is to decouple between insecurity and migration in European public perceptions. Aside from the deliberate amalgamation which forms part of the right-wing political discourse in most European countries, this perverse link is also a result of oversimplification and sensationalism in the media. There is a need for accurate, unbiased information on communities of foreign-born descent all across Europe stressing their contribution both to development and diversity within the EU.

## 2.12. Conclusions and Recommendations

The main conclusion of the 2006 EuroMeSCo Annual Conference, both in the sense that it reflects a broad consensus and summarises all the main points debated, and simultaneously sets forth an agenda for action for the Barcelona Process, was the recognition of the Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States as a political necessity. A number of key conditions of its viability were equally recognised.

- Democracy and fundamental rights – including the right to diversity which implies no distinction in the protection of individual rights and freedoms between citizens and non-citizens – constitute the mainstay of the Community of Democratic States.
- Inclusiveness requires a shared security culture grounded on the delegitimation of the use of force in resolving disputes; the consequences of the abandonment of this fundamental principle of international law in the Middle East must be addressed by the EMP.
- Intolerance must not be tolerated, but rather actively combated; the battle against intolerance and xenophobia must be freed of cultural reductionism and resolutely placed on the political terrain.

With this in view it is recommended that

- There is no substitute for the guarantee of human rights and freedoms when it comes to evaluating progress and working towards commonly stated goals. Establishing a common human rights agenda should be the top priority for the EMP. This should take into consideration the protection of human rights both in the north and the south, and integrate not only fundamental rights and freedoms but also migrants' rights and the link between justice and security. In 2007, when Germany and Portugal take their turn of duty at the helm of the EU, the drafting of a Euro-Mediterranean Charter of Migrants' Rights is suggested as a starting point. The protection of individual rights and freedoms should be regarded as the most important benchmark when evaluating progress within the EMP.
- There is no substitute for politics and the public space when it comes to promoting democracy and the rule of law. Political actors belong to the public space whatever their leanings, Islamist or otherwise. 'Political devolution' and openness are absolutely essential to win the fight against intolerance, conservatism and extremism.
- There is no substitute for knowledge when it comes to overcoming misrepresentations and stereotypes. The role of research in the social and political sciences was highlighted in this respect, as well as the value of literary and artistic expression which is itself a reflection of pluralism within societies. Exchanges in this broad domain were considered particularly relevant for the promotion of understanding between civil societies.

### **3. Euro-Mediterranean Political and Security Cooperation**

This chapter is destined to provide an overview of all research projects that were conducted in the framework of the EuroMeSCo research programme 2006. All projects were conducted either by at least one European and one southern Mediterranean institute or by at least two southern Mediterranean institutes.

#### **3.1. Ownership and Co-Ownership in Conflict Prevention in the Framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership**

**A comprehensive conflict-prevention policy based on co-ownership must be developed inside the EMP. This policy, however, must become not a straitjacket but a guide to a process that should include not only governments and organizations but also a range of groups, such as private companies, sub-regional and local authorities, and youth organizations.**

The rationale behind this research project is the need to prevent violent conflict in the Euro-Mediterranean area. In a region where people have long suffered from conflicts and disagreements, it is crucial to find conflict prevention policies that are based on co-ownership, thereby transforming local populations into actors in a cooperation process. In spite of the fact that conflict prevention is contemplated in the Barcelona Declaration, and further reinforced in subsequent statements and documents, the EMP has not yet shown any movement towards the co-ownership of conflict prevention policies. Hence, this study provides for some ideas about how to create distinct EMP policies, rather than individual state policies, that are built on cooperation between broad alliances of northern and southern societies.

The introductory first chapter describes the historical and conceptual background to the subsequent analyses that follow, focusing on the broad security relationship between the EMP partners. The chapter deals with the evolution of perceptions of the EMP's security task and the concepts of ownership and co-ownership in general. It concludes by asking whether the evolution that has taken place and the innovations that the recently adopted European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is bringing about will increase the EMP's as yet modest role in conflict prevention.

The second chapter, entitled "The Conflict Prevention Component of the EMP: Southern Security Perceptions", deals with southern perceptions, according to which conflict prevention as pursued by the North is often seen as intrusive and as serving northern interests. It is argued that challenges for the development of common conflict prevention policies emanate from differences between the North and the South. One such challenge is the difference in the way security is conceptualised, which relates to factors in the South such as the interconnectedness and overlapping of internal and international politics. Other differences are linked to the lack of a common definition of security and to an asymmetry in military capabilities. Furthermore, another challenge relates to the fact that some regard progress in the resolution of the Middle East conflict as a precondition for initiating common conflict prevention policies. The differences in threat perceptions over the origins of problems are important factors, but so also are the fundamental differences between north and south about which entities are the most relevant for cooperation.

The third chapter analyses the European perceptions of conflict prevention in the EMP. Considering its importance, the authors regard it as surprising that interest in this field is only of fairly recent origin. The European Security Strategy (ESS) and the capacity build-up that has now taken place in this field, however, demonstrate the new weight that is now being given to it. Although a success story in many ways, there are still deficiencies and internal inefficiencies. As the EU now rushes from case to case, the need to act in order to deal with the root causes of conflict becomes even clearer. It is being pointed out that a broader approach to conflict prevention is needed as well as a sustained effort, a more systematic development of multilateral preventive partnerships, and the inclusion into the EMP of the goal of ownership. All these require a learning process inside the EU, in the Mediterranean region and between the two.

The last chapter sets out the conclusions and offers some recommendations for future policies. It argues that a comprehensive conflict prevention policy based on co-ownership must be developed inside the EMP. This policy, however, must become not a straitjacket but a guide to a process that should include not only governments and organizations but also a range of groups, such as private companies, sub-regional and local authorities, and youth organizations. The authors particularly emphasise the importance of added knowledge and information in order to display openness combined with respect for the views of others and to achieve a more enlightened public debate. Institutional reforms are necessary as well, as is the development of a common security culture, which also includes a wider setting than that of the EU. Developments in the EU in the past few years have presented added opportunities for cooperation between North and South, which can take place at a variety of levels and in a variety of fields. At the same time, South–South cooperation may gain some benefits from experiences of cooperation further north, including in the Baltic countries. Creating a wide net of cooperation, across levels and fields, and involving people-to-people contacts is seen as the essence of a strong and viable conflict prevention policy based on co-ownership.

### **3.2. Conflict Prevention in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership**

This study complements the abovementioned study with empirical elements and was undertaken by means of the “Maastricht Watch” qualitative methodology and is based on the feedback of twenty experts, mostly coming from countries of the pre-enlarged EU and the Arab countries in the south-eastern Mediterranean.

The survey is divided into three main sections, the first of which regards the EU's conflict prevention policy, its rationale and effectiveness, its instruments and, in particular, the use of military and paramilitary tools. The second section concerns southern EMP members' perceptions and policies of conflict prevention while the third one explores respondents' views on the possibility of a joint conflict prevention approach and policy within the EMP.

**The EMP is regarded as a feasible framework to deal with South-South problems, but any EU engagement is supposed to take place on a basis of coordination and co-ownership with the southern partners.**

For most respondents, the EU's preference for conflict prevention is based on Europe's "history" and the inherent rationality of such an approach vis-a-vis a conflict-ridden region, such as North Africa and – more particularly – the Middle East. It is being argued that the wide spectrum of conflict prevention policies fits well with the significance of social, economic and cultural root causes of conflict in the region besides those of a political and strategic nature. On the other hand, as is maintained by many, conflict prevention fits better than other approaches with EU capabilities. In this context, all respondents point out (a) the clear effectiveness of EU conflict prevention approaches within the EU itself and towards designated EU member states and (b) the mixed results of EU conflict prevention policies in the EU neighbourhood and in sub-Saharan Africa. Ineffectiveness is supposedly due to a lack of (a) coordination, coherence, and proper decision-making (institutional factors), and (b) political will (political factors).

The survey explores five clusters of instruments (economic development, political reform, security governance and cooperation, combating small weapons trafficking, and WMD non-proliferation) and, in particular, the merit of regional integration and cooperation. Non-EU respondents consider economic development by far more significant and politically feasible than EU ones whereas both sides regard political reforms (human rights, the rule of law) equally important, though non-EU respondents are more convinced about the feasibility of reforms in their own countries than are their EU counterparts. While elections monitoring is seen by all respondents as significant and highly feasible, the democratisation of southern Mediterranean security forces looks very difficult and improbable to both sides. A medium score is provided to security cooperation – especially in the field of peacekeeping – by both sides, i.e. European and non-European respondents alike, whereas non-proliferation is seen as more significant and feasible than the prevention of small arms trafficking. In principle, most respondents appreciate regional cooperation as a preventive instrument, though the view is being expressed that multilateral frameworks have to be more homogeneous in order to be able to work and thus to facilitate conflict prevention initiatives.

European and non-European respondents agree in principle on the employment of military instruments in a preventive perspective as long as they are embedded in a broader political perspective and serve very well-defined aims during a limited and pre-defined period of time. Furthermore, in the eyes of some European respondents, military action has to be based on a number of approaches, i.e. it must be comprehensive and multidimensional, civil-military, inclusive, multilateral, based on human security, including non-governmental components, and help build local capabilities. Interestingly, non-European respondents point to two requirements of military action, namely legitimacy, as well as coordination and prior understanding with (and among) the countries in question.

According to most respondents, North-South military cooperation in a preventive perspective is feasible, but not necessarily in the EMP framework. Surprisingly, all respondents consider past EU interventions to be based on sound international legitimacy, whereas only three respondents (two from Europe and one from the South) prove to be well-informed about EU conflict prevention missions carried out so far. In contrast, the survey question relating to Arab conflict prevention policies received random responses, reflecting both unawareness and the fact that Arab countries don't contemplate over a regular conflict prevention approach.

As for perceptions, eighteen participants of the survey believe that differences between EU and Arab approaches to conflict prevention exist less because of historical and cultural reasons – as the questionnaire suggested – but rather because concepts of security, sources of threat, and security needs differ. Undoubtedly, in the southern Mediterranean partner countries a tendency exists to see traces of colonialism in EU policies, and a nationalist hard culture of sorts can be detected that is at odds with present political cultures in the EU. Finally, it is acknowledged by most that the nature of southern Mediterranean regimes must also be regarded as a factor generating differences.

Southern Mediterranean responses indicate that there is understanding and even respect for EU conflict prevention activities, yet the relevant respondents are unsatisfied with their poor impact on conflicts in the Middle East, notably the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Hence, there is a great degree of expectations revolving around conflict resolution and conflict prevention as such is not perceived as helpful in terms of Middle Eastern security requirements.

While respondents on both sides of the Mediterranean recognize the rationale of EU conflict prevention initiatives in Euro-Mediterranean relations, they are much less prepared to imagine such a rationale in any potential joint actions under the umbrella of the EMP.

Most participants agree that there should be an increasing degree of equality in the EMP as a pre-condition for joint actions. However, the majority does not believe that the EMP's involvement in North-North crises would make sense. In contrast, EMP involvement in North-South crises is not excluded but should only be considered on a case-by-case basis. All in all, the EMP is regarded as a feasible framework to deal with South-South problems, but any EU engagement is supposed to take place on a basis of coordination and co-ownership with the southern partners.

The evaluation of respondents' feedback reveals a consensus as regards the empowerment of non-governmental actors in the EMP framework with a view to developing a common culture of conflict prevention, thus facilitating, over time, joint actions at a governmental level. While some respondents are mostly thinking of cooperation between think tanks, others think of cooperation between more grass-roots-oriented NGOs.

### **3.3. Regional Security Dialogue and Cooperation in the South: Exploring the Neglected Dimension of the Barcelona Process**

This study probes the question of regional security dialogue and cooperation among the southern partners of the EMP. It includes a conceptual discussion of the notion of regional security cooperation, assessments of past experiences with regional dialogue in the Mediterranean and Middle East; an appraisal – on the basis of interviews carried out with NGO activists and policy makers – of current thinking on this issue and developments on the ground; and future prospects for regional dialogue and cooperation among these states, including some recommendations for the EU. Political and time constraints led to a focus on interviewing in Maghreb countries and Israel. While not exhaustive, the interviews carried out were clearly indicative of important trends that deserve to be highlighted. The working assumption of the study is that lack of progress on regional security cooperation among the southern partners in the EMP to date cannot simply be summed up as the result of the negative impact of unresolved conflicts in the South – and most importantly, the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The authors advocate thinking about conflict/tensions, and cooperation/Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) not as two distinct domains that must be advanced sequentially (i.e. first deal with conflicts, then look to advance confidence and cooperation), but rather as interrelated phenomena. Even when there is tension and conflict, there are very likely common interests that can be built upon, and there is a need to explore attitudes toward the value of such cooperation.

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In the first half of the study, two case studies of official attempts to promote regional dialogue and cooperation in the past decade and a half are examined: among the Maghreb states, and in the context of the multilateral talks initiated as part of the Madrid Peace Process in the early 1990s. Focus is on the reasons for the resistance and other obstacles that hindered these efforts, as well as the conditions for any successes that were registered. In the second half of the study, focus turns to the current situation, assessed on the basis of interviews carried out with officials and non-officials in the Maghreb and in Israel during the months January to May 2006. When trying to make sense of the multilateral talks of the early 1990s, the widespread acceptance of the fact that the multilaterals depended for their existence on progress in bilateral relations has kept other important dynamics (both positive and negative) hidden from view. Challenging the “bilateral-multilateral construct of dependence” is important for opening a space for multilateral regional dialogue that operates on its own logic, and for clarifying that in certain conditions such dialogue can and should be pursued independently, or in parallel with bilateral conflict management. The question of how security interests are defined can also not be left to assumptions but must be discussed candidly among parties to regional dialogue. The topics of discussion for regional cooperative dialogue must resonate with the participants as they must feel that they have something tangible to gain, in a reasonable time frame. In the Maghreb, the importance of the 5+5 Dialogue as a regional forum of dialogue, cooperation and global reflection is stressed. Still, this



Dialogue is plagued by problems: misunderstandings and divergent conceptions regarding desired relations between the Maghreb countries and other parts of the world have been an obstacle, as have national egoism and rivalries between leaders. The Maghreb is a vulnerable space that needs to be reorganised socially, politically and economically. The future of this region is threatened by dangers to its internal politics, and at the regional level, destabilization is fed by longstanding unresolved conflicts – particularly the question of the “Western Sahara.” This situation not only distances the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) ideal, but also encourages the emergence of extremist and radical forms of opposition. Official discourses remain linked to an ancestral logic – living in the shadows of the past as a source of inspiration for the future. Shared development and responsibility are not a question of style but rather a *sine qua non* condition for any future dialogue. Security is also closely linked to good governance. With regard to current trends and thinking, the thoughts and ideas of experts and intellectuals on the idea of regional security cooperation in the South at the conceptual level were tapped, and data on cooperative initiatives that are already in place (or that are being contemplated) were collected.

In the Maghreb, the results of the interviews relate more to the conceptual level than to concrete programs for cooperation. Major emphasis is on dynamics in the Maghreb and the AMU, with some reference to the question of Israel's integration in the Mediterranean. The idea of regional security cooperation in the Mediterranean is in the main viewed favourably, as something that should take place on the basis of mutual respect among states at both governmental and popular levels. Obstacles to progress regard the absence of democracy, violation of human rights, and corruption in southern states; leaders who want to remain in power even at the expense of their populations' welfare; lack of a clear and mutual vision about the future in these states; and persistent conflict between Morocco and Algeria over the Western Sahara. Maintaining security and implementing projects of cooperation and development in this region depend on the final resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. Economic issues are also viewed as key for getting such cooperation going; there is a need to work on these issues, in order to get to social and security issues. There is a need to start at the level of civil society and not wait until all political issues are solved, or leave things to the level of states and politicians. Much emphasis was placed on the issue of improving the internal situation in Arab states, and democratic reform was noted as an essential precondition for civil society to assume the important role that it needs to play in regional cooperative dynamics. As for cooperation with Israel, the latter is recognized as a reality in the region that cannot be denied or reversed, and some agreed that Israel's integration in the region would be beneficial for regional peace and development as it is the most technologically and economically developed state. There does not seem to be an objection to cooperation with Israel, although it was made clear that Israel must fulfil certain preconditions. In the Middle East, in-depth interviews were held with Israelis – officials and non-officials – that have an affinity to the issue of regional cooperation. Focus was on the concrete initiatives that are already in place, and that could be contemplated down the road. All results



were focused on the question of Israel engaging in cooperative dialogue with its neighbors. Potential areas for cooperation on soft security issues include fire-fighting, emergency and rescue operations, infectious diseases, and the spread of locusts. Beyond their direct security implications, these are issues that if left unattended have the potential of becoming even more serious security concerns. There is a fair degree of potential for cooperation between Israel and Jordan at the state-to-state level, and to a lesser extent with regard to the Israel-Jordan-Palestinian triangle. These venues are significant because of the geographical proximity that creates a sense of interdependence and strong common interest in a number of areas. There are also opportunities for wider regional cooperation, and some official initiatives have continued on from the early 1990s. There is no doubt room for more activity at the unofficial level of civil society. It is a question of taking the initiative and setting up the necessary frameworks.

The study proposes that it is in the interest of the EU to advance regional relations in the South. First, a major complaint against the EMP that comes from the direction of the southern states is that of asymmetry – the North is a united entity, whereas the South is a collection of states that are not only not integrated, but are torn by some long-standing conflicts. Secondly, the conceptual logic of cooperation has it that once cooperation begins, it can thereafter have a pacifying effect on regional conflicts themselves. Finally, the Barcelona Process is the only remaining official venue where regional states are still meeting on a regular basis, and while there is much criticism of the effectiveness of the forum, there is a basic acceptance of its overall positive intention and nature. Every effort should be made to maintain and enhance the unique potential of this framework of dialogue. In the balance of pessimism and optimism, although there are many problems involved in the initiation of cooperative security dialogue, there are also some useful guidelines that can help in the pursuit of this goal.

### **3.4. Algeria, the Arab Maghreb Union and Regional Integration in North Africa**

Numerous experts regard regional integration in North Africa as one of the major responses to the difficulties that are discernible in the region, such as unemployment, poverty, bad governance, and social violence. North African economies have been ignoring each other (to date, intra-North African trade amounts to a mere 3%) and their leaders have been engaged in relations marked by mutual distrust. This survey conducted in Algeria, between July and August 2006, seeks to understand how the Algerian population explains the stagnation of the Maghreb as regards regional cooperation.

The results of the survey clearly show that this stagnation is mainly due to a democratic deficit, as is demonstrated by the overwhelming majority of respondents

that is in favour of the creation of a North African parliament in which democratically elected MPs would seek to serve their citizens. Hence, only 3% of all respondents are very satisfied with the AMU's policies while 70% are unsatisfied. In spite of the AMU lack of results, a strong hope for the realisation of a regional integration project still exists, as is reflected by 76% of the respondents who are interested in the success of the AMU. For the majority of the respondents, the AMU represents an answer to the process of globalisation and an opportunity to open up marginalised and poorly developed economies and societies. Its image is not too negative, but somewhat vague. This is understandable given the AMU's difficulties in marketing its achievements. Indeed, 69% of respondents are incapable of naming a single achievement, and only 5% were able to name one AMU-initiated project. Hence, regional integration in North Africa is regarded as useful and important by 48% of all respondents and as an utopia of sorts by only 15%; yet the vast majority doubts that the AMU can ever be fully realised. This feeling stems from the expressed desire for a "rapprochement" of the peoples in the region (43%) with which Algerians share a common language and religion. The social and civilisational dimensions that are supposed to favour a union remain ever present in spite of political and historical facts. The belief that the peoples of the region share common traits is so strong that not a single respondent stressed that the problems between Algeria and Morocco stem from "differences between the peoples". Instead, as the growth potential of an integrated Maghreb has been repeatedly acknowledged, it is maintained that only political will is necessary to put an end to the vicious circle that has been keeping the region deadlocked and the tensions between Morocco and Algeria alive, to the point that the risk of open conflict cannot be ruled out.

In that light, only democracy can make leaders go beyond a national logic in order to put in place the conditions needed to implement a regional integration project. But in order for this to happen, the EU must increase its engagement in the region, if only because it represents a successful model of regional development. In this vein, the survey's main finding is that regional integration can be achieved only through democratisation. The democratic deficit accounts for the weakness of regional integration, since democracy and integration go hand in hand.

### **3.5. Migrant Communities and the Internal and External Dynamics of Integration: The Potential Roles of Immigrants in the EMP**

The generalisation (globalisation) of human migratory movements, as stated in the report of the Global Commission on International Migration of the UN, the emergence of itineraries that break with the classical dichotomy between emigration countries and immigration countries, and the consolidation of immigrant communities on all continents oblige a change in perception with regard to migration. If migration in the sixties and seventies represented a break with their countries of origin for many

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migrants, migration at the turn of the 21st century is occurring in a context in which person-to-person communication is easier and human mobility also much greater. This global process now involves not only the arrival of people in wealthy societies, but also the presence of trans-national communities throughout the world, as well as new types of lifestyles arising in and around border cities.

As stated in the EuroMeSCo Report *Barcelona Plus. Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States*, the presence of migrant communities in Europe is leading to a redefinition of basic concepts of citizenship, identity and democracy. It also remarks the role that migration plays on North-South demographic complementarity, solidarity and minimizing threat perceptions. One of the central points on this perspective is linked to trans-national migration, and its potential role to reshape national citizenship and decision-making bodies, since migrants can become significant actors to promote democracy and social justice.

Since the role of communities can be analyzed by the dynamics of its social, economic, civic or political networks and practices and as it can be studied by the intensity among and within different migrant collectives and diasporas, this study aims to focus on the role of migrant communities, both with respect to the country of destination and the country of origin, and thus the crucial role they can play in the forthcoming years in the EMP.

**The rights of women have been in effect absent from the EMP and ENP initiatives over the past ten years.**

### **3.6. Women as Full Participants in the Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States**

The core perspective of this study is that the right of women is a fundamental aspect of the project to create an integrated Euro-Mediterranean region based on democracy, the rule of law and the protection of fundamental human rights as outlined in the Barcelona Declaration and reaffirmed in 2005. The study outlines the major priorities for the EMP as regards the rights of women and the participation of women in political reform processes, and makes recommendations on how to ensure that the rights of women become central features of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, so that women can become full participants in the project of transforming the Partnership into what the 2005 EuroMeSCo Report called a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States. The study recognises the profound changes that have taken place in the Euro-Mediterranean area over the last few years, the central importance of ongoing processes of political, social and economic reform in the region, and the growing role of women's rights movements in that context. However, it notes that the rights of women have been in effect absent from the EMP and ENP initiatives over the past ten years. The decision to organise a Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference on the rights of women is seen as an opportunity to redress this omission, and to put the rights of women at the forefront of the Barcelona Process.

Although the partner states of the EMP have at least theoretically or nominally recognised the indivisibility and interdependence of civil, political, social and economic rights at the international multilateral level, most notably in the context of the 1993 United Nations (UN) Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, they have yet to act according to this integrated view. To date, they have adopted a one-dimensional focus on the role of women in economic development processes, reflecting the view that predominated over a decade, namely that the first aim of the Partnership was development, which would then create the conditions for stability and, in the long run, perhaps even democracy.

As pointed out in the EuroMeSCo *Barcelona Plus* Report, however, this sequential and linear perspective was mistaken: because of the indivisibility and interdependence of social and economic rights on the one hand, and civil and political rights on the other, economic development policies cannot come to full fruition without parallel policies to ensure political participation and justice. As the EMP experience has demonstrated, such policies are currently not conducive, either in terms of democracy or of full respect for the rights of women. Some examples suffice to illustrate the point: discriminatory inheritance laws (civil rights) have a serious impact on the ability of women to participate in economic life (economic rights); women being registered as voters on the Family Card under the name of their husband or father (civil rights) limits their effective ability to enjoy their legal right to vote as autonomous individuals (political rights); and restrictions on the mobility of women (civil rights) has an impact on their access to health and reproductive care and education (social rights).

The EMP states have thus failed to recognise that the full realisation of socio-economic rights is not separable from the achievement of civil and political rights and that the pursuit of a framework for the realisation of all fundamental human rights calls for policies that recognise the indivisibility and interdependence of rights. Further, they have failed to recognise that women's rights must be addressed as an integral part of both political *and* socio-economic transformation.

Piecemeal perspectives and a non-holistic view of the various aspects of the rights of women – civil, political, social and economic – the Partnership cannot properly promote the rights of women and their full participation in processes of political reform and transformation. In other words, only a commitment to pluralism and participatory democracy can ultimately ensure full respect for the rights of women. Hence, this study emphasises that the challenge of recognising interdependence and indivisibility of human rights and of the rights of women in particular, is equally relevant in the northern and southern partner states: while the north has largely overcome the barriers posed by legal discrimination, *de facto* gender equality is still far from being achieved and while levels of discrimination and exclusion are not as aggravated as in the south, they are still also very much a part of the experience of women in Europe.

**The EMP states have failed to recognise that the full realisation of socio-economic rights is not separable from the achievement of civil and political rights and that the pursuit of a framework for the realisation of all fundamental human rights calls for policies that recognise the indivisibility and interdependence of rights.**

The legal and de facto experiences of women in the Euro-Mediterranean area are characterised as much by commonality as they are by an immense variability. Women's rights and participation differ between northern and southern partner states, but they differ also within the north and the south. Any policies to address gender equality and the participation of women in society and politics must take this into account. Context-insensitivity and classic north-south dichotomies do not provide an adequate policy-making perspective.

### **3.7 Mapping European and American Economic Initiatives towards Israel and the Palestinian Authority and their Effects on Honest Broker Perceptions**

Since the 1990s, both the USA and the EU have shown their commitment to play a role as a mediator, or as a facilitator, between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Yet, in order for a third party to become a successful mediator, it/he/she has to earn a certain degree of trust from both protagonists in the dispute. In this regard, one question to be answered is what characteristics the mediator should display vis-à-vis each party in conflict to be perceived as a reliable partner. This study will precisely focus on the economic relationships between the external powers and the conflicting parties, assuming that some economic initiatives might affect the level of trust which is necessary to gain an honest broker status. The aim is to identify American and European economic initiatives vis-à-vis the Israelis and the Palestinians in a comparative perspective, so as to understand if they have any effect to ameliorate the political credits of the US and the EU on the ground.

Israel currently receives around \$3 billion per year in total economic and military grants, refugee settlement assistance, and other aid. US military assistance amounts to 80% of the total. The US considers Israel as a close ally, targeting political and economic stability of Israel as a priority for their foreign policy in the Middle East. On the other hand, the EU officially declares that since Israel has high national income per capita it is not eligible for development aid. Yet the economic relationship between Israel and the EU is a close one, and it is maintained and developed essentially through an extensive system of commercial agreements. The EU is Israel's overall biggest trading partner, accounting in 2005 for around 37% of Israel total trade, while the relative trade with the US accounts for only 27%. Nevertheless, a closer look at the trade figures shows that when examining total flows over time, the picture becomes complex, with a progressive re-orientation of Israeli trade toward other geographical directions.

Israel has become habituated to US defence assistance and subsequently relies with great confidence on the latter to guarantee its security concerns. Not only is the massive economic and military aid connecting the two countries, but there are also active joint defence projects (e.g. the Arrow Missile project) that connect the two armies on the ground and their respective defence industries. Concerning

the EU-Israel relationship, some political elements seem to affect the evolution of bilateral trade, regardless of existing formal agreements. Israeli exports to the EU dropped by 10% immediately after the starting of the second Intifada, while they remained stable with the US, indicating that US-Israel trade relations are more solid than between the EU and Israel. The EU inclination to use trade agreements as a foreign policy tool may thus be justified when dealing with Israel, yet it does not seem to be very effective in terms of confidence-building.

Due to internal political and other structural constraints, the Palestinian economy is notably underdeveloped, very unstable and depending on outside stimuli. The level of external trade is negligible and an average 70% of it is realized with Israel. A discussion of trade issues on the Palestinian side does therefore essentially focus on the administrative and legal constraints impeding the free circulation of goods inside the Palestinian territories and at border crossings. While the US action to ease these difficulties is quite limited, the EU has shown a certain continuity in supporting the Palestinian institutions to gain their economic autonomy. This dimension of the EU action actually affects in some way their political relationship with Israel, while it does not have a very concrete effect on trading conditions for the Palestinians. International financial assistance to the Palestinians has been exceptionally high, with the international community spending on the whole over US 6\$ billion since the signing of the Oslo agreement (1993). Europe collectively accounts for over a half of this effort, while the US is the most important bilateral donor to the Palestinians.

In the period of transition opened by the Palestinian electoral process in 2005-2006, the EU launched two important missions translating on the field a greater motivation to be involved as a third party: the EU-BAM, with European presence contributing to the regular opening of the Rafah Crossing Point, and the EU-COPPS, in support to the Palestinian civil police. But the suspension of aid to the Hamas elected government in March 2006 has seriously and immediately downgraded the economic conditions in the Territories and put an immediate emphasis on emergency needs. The suspension of aid did affect the general level of trust placed in the Western powers, but it did not fundamentally change the perceived hierarchy of external actors: ultimately, there is on the Palestinian side a sense that the US are in command, and that they are not working in a direction that is favourable to the Palestinian people.

Hence, the ambition of this study is to discuss the relevance of economic initiatives as political tools to gain trust from both parties in conflict. The study initially started with the assumption that some symmetry could be found between the Israeli and the Palestinian side, with a differing system of alliances bolstered by the economic presence and initiatives of the US and the EU: the Israelis were thought to trust spontaneously more the US because they receive regular financial support from Washington, while the Palestinians should rely more on the EU, which has continuously worked in favour of the establishment of an autonomous Palestinian economy, considered as an essential aspect of state-building in the long run.

**The EU may be relatively trusted by the Palestinians, as it is believed to hold a more balanced position, but it might not be trusted as a mediator, because it is essentially considered as a weak political actor.**

The findings of this study do relatively confirm the picture on the Israeli side, but also reveal that EU commercial initiatives failed to give rise to political trust in Israel. Collected data helped qualifying the picture on the Palestinian side, suggesting that there is no immediate link between the level of economic commitment from the powers and their perception as potential allies: the US did spend a lot of money in the Palestinian territories, but this did not raise their political credits. At the same time, they are still heeded to be the only external actor capable of influencing Israel for the framing of a final settlement. The EU may be relatively trusted by the Palestinians, as it is believed to hold a more balanced position, but it might not be trusted as a mediator, because it is essentially considered as a weak actor.

### **3.8. The Adaptation of EU and US Democracy Promotion Programmes to the Local Political Context in Jordan and Palestine and their Relevance to Grand Geopolitical Designs**

The purpose of this study is to compare the priorities and methods of American and European administrations for the promotion of democratic values and institutions in the Middle East, taking Jordan and the Palestinian territories as case-studies. It tries to evaluate the consistency of the US' and EU's democracy-promotion policies, especially pondering the influence of regional strategic parameters on the implementation of co-operation programmes on a local scale.

Both the US and the EU have indeed recently confirmed their intention to encourage political reform in the Middle East and are currently working to upgrade their frame of action in order to make it more immediately efficient. Democracy has even explicitly become a top priority on the Middle Eastern agenda of American foreign policy, while the EU's vocabulary remains more vague. However, if American and European political priorities seem to roughly converge, their methods and tools of intervention are not entirely comparable, thus revealing the experimental bias of democracy-promotion policies and also the underlying principles and values driving them. Whereas both the US and the EU claim to be generally advocating a rather determined democratic model, some local variants may be observed, primarily addressing the "needs" on the field as perceived by the donors. At the same time, the contents of co-operation programmes depend on the particular political constraints locally met. Closer examination of the co-operation frames with Jordan and the Palestinian territories thus reveals that Western action in favour of democratic reform is notably influenced there by the specific context linked to the continuation and/or intensification of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. The discourse and effective actions undertaken to encourage political change under such a strong external constraint are therefore likely to meet the regional strategic priorities of both external powers, notably confirming the difficulty to



solve the democracy vs. security dilemma. Recent Western attitudes with regard to the internal political dynamics of the Palestinian territories offer a striking illustration of these difficulties.

Given these background hypotheses, the specific objectives of this study are the following: a) to evaluate the consistency of European and American approaches for political reform and democratisation in Jordan and the Palestinian territories, through the contents of programmes and projects, trying to compare the respective political and institutional models inspiring them; b) to assess the elements of adaptation of both EU and US frameworks of intervention to the specific political context of each territory in a comparative perspective, searching for the parameters accounting for these changes; c) to contribute to a better comprehension of the compared EU and US strategic visions of the political and institutional future of the Near East region; d) to question the appreciation of Western efforts by local stakeholders, so as to ameliorate existing “democratic partnerships” in the countries under observation; e) to explore the possibilities to build bridges between the Western donors’ strategies in favour of democracy promotion in the region.

In order to meet these general objectives, the study is structured as follows: The first section examines how and to what extent democratisation has become a new norm for Western foreign policies regarding the Middle East; the second section describes American and European approaches for democracy-promotion in Jordan and the Palestinian Territories, trying to assess their similarities and divergences whereas the third section evaluates how local stakeholders react to external intervention focusing on political reform in their respective country. The fourth section analyzes the relevance of specific democracy promotion programmes to the grand geopolitical visions of the Western powers for the Middle East, and the study concludes with some conclusions and recommendations to improve actors’ frame of intervention.

This study is essentially based on an extensive review of existing literature relating to the ongoing debate on Western democracy promotion policies in the Arab world. Some field work was conducted in parallel in Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Territories. In contrast, the political context of this study evolved rather dramatically during the period necessary to complete work. The Western decision to suspend aid to the new Hamas-led government in the Palestinian Territories in March 2006 indeed considerably disrupted the routine of democracy-promotion in the region. This option is largely being commented in this study, as it bears important consequences, announcing a tactical and substantial re-orientation of the Western democratic vision for the Middle East. Furthermore, the political and security climate did evolve very negatively in the beginning of the summer, with the re-opening of the military front on the Israel-Lebanon border.

**The Western decision to suspend aid to the Hamas-led government in March 2006 considerably disrupted the routine of democracy-promotion in the region.**



### **3.9. Political Scenarios for the EU and its Neighbourhood – Views from Selected Southern Mediterranean and Eastern European Countries**

This study is based on the existing literature and 20 focused interviews that were conducted during the period from March to May 2006 with policy-makers, academics, and think tank representatives in one southern Mediterranean country (Egypt), four new EU member states (Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia), a designated EU member state (Turkey) and Brussels. The new EU member states were selected on the grounds of their relevant experience while Egypt has been chosen for its alleged leadership role in the Arab world, and because of its status as *primus inter pares* of sorts among the southern Mediterranean partner countries (MPC). Turkey is included in the study due to its hybrid status as an EU candidate country, and thus as a stakeholder of the enlargement process, and its participation in the EMP as a MPC. Furthermore, the authors assume that its European vocation may have a significant impact on the geographical scope and content of the EU's neighbourhood policy.

The objective of this study is to develop four different scenarios related to the possible implications of two major decisions the EU needs to take. First, a decision is pending on the future institutional setup of the EU, as expressed in the Constitutional Treaty. After the negative French and the Dutch referenda on the text in 2005, no decision on this matter has yet been taken. Therefore, the EU's "*finalité politique*" remains undecided.

Since the 2004 enlargement, many citizens and decision-makers in the member states of the EU have been wary of a further extension of the EU's borders. There is a widespread view that enlargement might have been 'too much too soon', and that the EU was ill-prepared to take on board new members. In any case, the main consequence of the 2004 "big bang" enlargement for the future of the process is that the prospects for further enlargement are less favourable than they were three years ago. Concerns have been voiced over the EU's absorption capacity and calls are being made for the EU to define its ultimate borders. At the same time, calls for support of further enlargement are being voiced on the premise that the EU's membership means enlargement of a zone of peace and prosperity. Therefore, the EU's "*finalité géographique*", as the authors coin it, also remains unclear.

Questions revolving around the fate of the Constitution and future enlargements feature prominently in European policy debates. The answers to these fundamental questions will not only determine the EU's own future course. They will also frame the way in which the EU relates to global politics, and thus its closest neighbourhood. Since the historical enlargement in 2004, the ENP has been the EU's major foreign policy initiative, linking the EU policy debates to the EU's foreign policy ambitions. In this light, this study discusses the ways in which the major European questions (and some possible answers to them) are believed to impact upon the ENP according to

a number of selected partners in the southern Mediterranean and Eastern Europe. The analysis is guided by four major political scenarios for the future development of Europe, all of which relate to the Constitution and further rounds of enlargement.

Although admittedly simplified for analytical purposes, these scenarios, all of which relate to the EU's finalité, are: a) the Constitution is rejected and further enlargement allowed, leading to a "divided Europe"; b) the Constitution is rejected and further enlargement suspended, leading to a "Europe in limbo"; c) the Constitution is adopted and further enlargement suspended, leading to an "inward-looking Europe"; d) the Constitution is adopted and further enlargement allowed, leading to an "outward-looking Europe".

Although this study outlines all the four possible scenarios, it can be assumed that most analysts would agree that the last two scenarios are rather unrealistic in the short- and medium-term. For this reason the study addresses these scenarios more superficially and discusses extensively the other two scenarios. The study focuses on the manner in which the EU's relations with the neighbouring nations change under each of the scenarios. This is done through a discussion of the future of the ENP which, in turn, is somewhat determined by the fate of the Constitutional Treaty and further enlargement. The ENP was launched by the European Commission in 2003 to serve as the single most important framework for the EU's relations with its neighbours. Yet, the ENP is still lacking many elements of a full-fledged foreign policy and, at least at this point, it remains, to a large extent, an unfulfilled opportunity for the development of relations with the southern Mediterranean and eastern European neighbours (including the southern Caucasus). The functioning of the ENP and thus its future course is very closely related to the challenges the EU faces. First, the Constitutional Treaty lists the ENP and provides it with a primary legal basis. It declares that "the EU shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring States, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness." Second, the Constitution provides the underlying political and legal framework of the ENP by shaping the EU's future role, objectives, image, identity, and, moreover, the making and conduct of its foreign policy. Again, since its inception, the ENP has been closely associated with the enlargement policy as it was generally modelled after the enlargement templates; it was conceptualized by the same officials in the European Commission who had led the 2004 enlargement process. "In the light of the relative weakness of past policies towards these ENP countries in promoting these values", the ENP was conceived as a policy to "extend the reform stimulus of enlargement to the would-be new neighbours of the EU" and was thought as an alternative to full membership of the Eastern European countries.

With respect to the EMP, one of the major findings of this study relates to the fact that the new EU member states, with the exception of Malta and Cyprus, prefer a low-key approach given the general lack of expertise and the virtual absence of any relevant debate on Euro-Mediterranean issues, as is expressed by the statement of one interviewee who stated that 'the Mediterranean, seen from most of the EU's

**The new EU member states, with the exception of Malta and Cyprus, prefer a low-key approach given the general lack of expertise and the virtual absence of any relevant debate on Euro-Mediterranean issues.**

new member states, is a distant sea'. Furthermore, it can be asserted that the interrelationship between the ENP and the EMP has not been sufficiently crystallised as the former seems to have turned into a technocratic and bureaucratic tool for the EU's assistance in the southern Mediterranean area, whereas the latter has developed into an instrument of political dialogue between northern and southern partners of the EMP.

### **3.10. Factors and Perceptions Influencing the Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Selected Southern Mediterranean Partner Countries**

This study attempts to provide an overview of the ENP and assess the future prospects of the new policy for its southern partner countries. Its primary concern is to analyze whether the ENP could make a difference for its southern partners when compared with previous initiatives and mechanisms. In keeping with the aims of the study, which by necessity restricted its overall scope, it was deemed sensible to focus on case studies. Three Arab countries that signed and adopted the Actions Plans in 2005 were chosen, namely, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. While Israel is a special case for obvious reasons and thus not integrated in this study, Egypt and Lebanon, with which Action Plan talks have already taken place, and Algeria, which has also been incorporated into the initiative, as well as the Palestinian Authority, are discussed in an overview chapter. The analysis sets out to assess the ENP's chances of reaching the objectives, especially the normative ones, laid out in the Action Plans. The states selected are not merely the only sovereign Arab states in the southern neighbourhood of the EU that have adopted Action Plans in 2005 but are also those states that maintain particularly close relations with the EU. As the implementation of the ENP's reform objectives requires both the willingness of governments to reform and the acceptance of the majority of societies, it is also important to analyze how the ENP's reform agenda is perceived in individual countries. In this vein, studies conducted based on field researches and numerous problem-oriented interviews with representatives of governments, business and society; they dealt with the question of acceptance for external reform concepts, "Western" norms and reform demands, intensified cooperation with the EU and how European and American politics and offers of cooperation are perceived.

The ENP, launched by the European Commission in March 2003, is designed to address the EU's enlarged neighbourhood and the inclusion-exclusion dilemma in conjunction with the demands of its citizens. Put differently, the new policy has been initiated to overcome two foreign policy challenges: enlargement fatigue and the management of external borders. With the adoption of the Action Plans by Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority and Israel in 2005, the ENP entered a new phase in its implementation. As far as the ENP's Mediterranean

dimension is concerned, the ENP could be regarded as a pragmatic way of activating the plugged goals of the Barcelona Process. Yet, it is evident that the new neighbourhood policy has external and internal challenges of its own; notably the imprecision and superficiality of the Action Plans, the insufficiency and ambiguity of the incentives on offer, and the emphasis on interests and stakes rather than shared values and benefits. The chances of the ENP contributing to a qualitative and quantitative improvement in the EMP will depend substantially on the political situation that the leaders of the European partner countries are to face in and outside the southern Mediterranean countries. It will also depend on other factors, including the unresolved conflicts in the Mashreq countries, and the structural, economic and societal factors within the individual countries.

A closer look at the Action Plans of Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan shows that the ENP places more emphasis on economic reforms and collaboration than on political and security cooperation. Indeed, effective security cooperation relies upon the EU taking affirmative impartial steps towards conflict resolution and reaffirming its stance towards Israel's nuclear capability. Although all four countries' main concerns are inner security and stability, and they are primarily interested in the economic reform agenda of the ENP, perceptions, expectations, and the anticipated implementation of the goals of the ENP differ among them.

In the case of Morocco, the leadership sees the ENP as an opportunity to collaborate on illegal migration and counterterrorism as well as a chance to improve its access to the EU market. It is therefore proceeding with the implementation of reforms, albeit in the longer term. Tunisia, however, is more reluctant to reform its political system out of concern for unrest and instability that is anticipated as a result of the establishment of the free trade zone in 2010. However, it is also eager to increase economic cooperation and encourage investment from the EU. For Jordan, implementing social reform and the gradual development of a modern political party system is partly dependent on positive improvements in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Preserving stability in Jordan is key, as is the case in Lebanon, as interviews have shown.

The Palestinian Authority is a somewhat different case, as it is not a sovereign state and the EU is uncertain how to approach current political realities. As the question of whether Hamas sees the Action Plan as binding remains unanswered, the ENP cannot start to be fully implemented by either side.

In sum, in countries with which Action Plans have been put into effect, positive tendencies toward cooperation with the EU within the ENP framework are evident, as long as national interests are acknowledged, stability and security are at the forefront of cooperation and there are considerable economic benefits. In Egypt and Algeria, whose Action Plans are expected to be finalized in the coming year, however, outside pressure for democratization is altogether rejected.

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### **3.11. Drawing Lessons From Spain's and Turkey's Security Sector Reforms for the Mediterranean**

Security Sector Reform (SSR) and more specifically the Democratic Civilian Control of the Armed Forces (DCCAF) have become key issues in current debates on political reform. As SSR and DCCAF are emerging topics, intersecting both comparative politics and security studies fields of international relations, their theoretical frameworks are largely developed around comparative studies. This study attempts to contribute to the design of the EU's policies on democracy and good governance promotion in the Mediterranean region by drawing lessons from Turkey's and Spain's DCCAF. The first part of this study builds the conceptual framework around DCCAF, considered as a narrow central component of a broader spectrum of SSR, which aims at setting up the accountability of military forces to constitutionally-elected civilians and civil society, in line with a transparent and accountable policy-making and a clear division of responsibility between the civil and military sectors.

Since the end of the Cold War, democratic and civilian control of the military has climbed high on the agenda of international organisations such as the EU or NATO. The context and the structures that enforce DCCAF have progressively become inextricably linked with the processes of enlargement and DCAFF has turned into a political precondition for candidate countries, which have to ensure their adaptation to entry requirements, that is to say, democracy and regional security.

The theoretical framework of this study concludes with a definition of what is to be understood of "civilian control", referring to the setting-up procedures of democratic accountability, which transcend bureaucratic mechanisms of oversight and adopt a more inclusive approach that promotes the participation of wider sectors of civil society, academic circles, all interested parties and the media in public debate on defence and security. The second part of this study presents an overview of the current EU approach towards SSR and DCCAF promotion in the Mediterranean area, which so far has not achieved a positive record. The third part of this study is devoted to a separate analysis of DCAFF processes in Spain and Turkey and examines the following aspects:

- 1) The Armed Forces influence on civilian affairs: This section analyses the role and mission of the military and how it is regulated by the law (while in Spain its mission is to "guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain and to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional order", in Turkey it prevails a "guardianship role"), its evolution and reforms, the present political class' linkage with the military, and the professionalisation and modernisation of the army.
- 2) The key transformations carried out in Turkey and Spain that are relevant to DCAFF: This section deals with the measures that each country has developed to improve defence institutions, national security policy-making or control and accountability.
- 3) The internal and external pressures that have contributed to DCAFF: While internal pressures were

crucial in the Spanish case, the prominent “guardian role” of the Turkish Armed Forces precluded civil society, political parties and its own officer cadres from exerting effective pressure towards democratic reform and readdressing the civil military balance. As far as external pressures are concerned, and while NATO played a “modernising” role, the EU had a more “democratising” impact. EU conditionality criteria played an important influence on both DCAFF processes. 4) The impact and conditioning of domestic and international terrorism. Both countries have been affected by terrorist attacks of domestic nature (ETA/PKK), and also have been the target of international terrorist groups linked to Al-Qaeda. This section deals with the fact that the presence of the terrorist threat is subject to political exploitation by those segments that would like to grant the Armed Forces a stronger role in politics. Once the analysis of each case has been fulfilled, the fourth part of the study concentrates on comparing and contrasting the Spanish and Turkish cases in order to draw some general lessons that can be of use for other countries of the Mediterranean neighbourhood willing to carry out DCAFF processes.

The last section of this study is devoted to giving concrete policy recommendations and some policy proposals to the EU and the rest of the EMP members, in order to improve the SSR record and specifically DCCAF in the Mediterranean area. The first general recommendation refers to the fact that since the lure of EU membership is currently not being offered to the Mediterranean countries, the EU has to rethink the principle of positive conditionality in order to make incentives attractive enough for Mediterranean countries to adhere to democratic principles. A second general recommendation is the need for a horizontal approach towards the main challenges affecting the region, taking into consideration political, economical and social factors. The last general recommendation is centred on the urgency for deeper EU involvement in the open regional conflicts as a precondition for a change in the security paradigm. Difficult and costly as these efforts may be, member states should understand that no DCCAF progress is possible if the military in partner countries legitimises its role in politics through external threats. Taking these three general recommendations into account, the study also provides some concrete policy proposals regarding DCCAF and SSR promotion in the southern and eastern Mediterranean grouped into the following categories: 1. Conceptual work: Both political actors and civil society in the EU and in the southern Mediterranean countries should familiarise and incorporate into their discourse the following four new concepts; SSR, DCCAF, human security and peace culture. 2. Coherence: Effective SSR and DCCAF promotion demand coherence at three different levels: within the EU’s first community pillar and the second intergovernmental pillar; between the EU and its member states’ policies; between the EU and other international actors; and among regional and multilateral initiatives. 3. Effective conditionality: In order to be really effective, the ENP Action Plans should detail the incentives that could be offered to each country according to the steps that a country makes. DCCAF should be considered as one of the many negotiation chapters and the “carrots”, adapted to the country’s main interests, would only be given if the country is leading a transformation of its security policies

**SSR and DCCAF should not be perceived as goals in themselves but as significant and indispensable elements of the democratisation process. A country cannot democratise without efforts to incorporate the principles of DCCAF.**

towards more democratisation. 4. Cooperative efforts: In those cases where the third country does not seem to respond to incentives, the EU should take into account that opening some cooperation frameworks related to the security field could also be beneficial for DCCAF in the mid- or long term (offering know-how in military issues; opening spaces where DCAFF may be debated; etc.). 5. Fighting terrorism and promoting democratisation simultaneously: The EU needs to develop a comprehensive and unwavering policy of fighting terrorism by simultaneously insisting that democratisation and DCCAF should nevertheless proceed. Thus, when the EU expresses its readiness in cooperating with the Mediterranean countries against terrorism, it simultaneously needs to underline the necessity to complement those with DCCAF and SSR efforts. 6. Increasing transparency and providing information: No effective DCCAF promotion policy can be designed and applied without the necessary information on military affairs in partner countries.

The final conclusion of this study is that SSR and DCCAF should not be perceived as goals in themselves but as significant and indispensable elements of the democratisation process. A country cannot democratise without efforts to incorporate the principles of DCCAF. Indeed, the pre-eminence of the military in a country's politics and society could hamper other aspects of its democratisation process. Consequently, a holistic approach towards SSR and democracy promotion is needed.

### **3.12. Political Liberalisation and Transition to Democracy: Lessons from the Mediterranean and Beyond: Morocco, Turkey, Spain and Portugal**

The study reflects on the lessons that might be learned from particular experiences with processes of political opening or liberalisation and subsequent transition to democratic rule in countries as different as Morocco, Portugal, Spain and Turkey. It consists of an exercise in comparative political study, one of the major scientific methodologies for the discovery of what is unique and what is shared between countries and cultures. The comparative approach permits a flexibility and breadth of study, without sacrificing rigor, and brings to life the specificities and shared characteristics and dynamics of societies in a way that is not possible with quantitative analyses.

There is a vast literature on the subject of democratisation and innumerable comparative studies of processes of liberalisation and transitions to democracy. This study draws on that tradition, but its aim is not to provide extensive and detailed coverage of the theoretical debates in that area of study. The aim is to cover various areas and give readers a flavour of the main issues and points, rather than extensive coverage of all the academic literature on any given subject. The study adopts wider



than usual thematic breadth, covering areas as diverse as civil-military relations, religion and democracy and the role of the media in democratisation. It therefore draws on a variety of sources beyond those normally used in less wide-ranging comparative studies of democratisation. The study is intended to cater to a broad audience within the Euro-Mediterranean “community” rather than to specialists; it intends to provide that diverse audience with general information and key points about each thematic area rather than with detailed comparisons, although by providing “boxes” of information, it complements the generalist approach with an attempt at more detailed coverage. Ultimately, the aim of this study is to provide Euro-Mediterranean policy-makers, students, non-governmental agents and other non-specialists with an overview of the many complex issues involved in processes of democratisation, and to show how the experiences of successful democratisation in some countries can provide clues about similar processes elsewhere.

The study is organised thematically, covering eight basic issue areas, with relevant examples taken from each of the case studies assessed under each thematic heading. The first chapter shows how defining the “rules of the game” is one of the founding moments of any process of transition away from authoritarian rule to democracy. The rules established by new or reformed constitutions have an impact on fundamental institutional issues, such as the relations between the military and civilian authorities, the nature of monarchies, the choice between parliamentary or presidential systems of governance, and the nature of law-making and the place of jurisprudence in the political process. The aim of addressing this issue is therefore to see how different countries have opted for different rules, institutional frameworks and systems of representation, negotiation and decision-making that vary according to national historical traditions and the new demands posed by a new democratic dispensation.

The second chapter shows how political parties are the central vehicle for representation in a democratic system, and so their development and programmatic stance is of crucial importance in any process of liberalisation and future democratisation. The aim here is to identify the major political forces at work in each country, understand how a minimal “democratic consensus” was or may be formed among competing parties, and further to assess how each nascent democracy dealt with the problems of what Juan Linz called the “disloyal opposition.” If authoritarian regimes are weakened and the most popular parties are not committed to democracy (disloyal) and are yet able to come to power through legitimate democratic elections, how should liberalising regimes and pro-democratic parties relate to that opposition, and how should they frame the constraints on the politics of transition to avoid a reversion to a new kind of authoritarianism. Can positive behaviour be induced among a disloyal opposition? It may not be necessary for all parties to be ‘true believers’ in democracy, as long as they decide that it is more profitable to behave democratically.

**Defining the “rules of the game” is one of the founding moments of any process of transition away from authoritarian rule to democracy.**



The third chapter shows how one of the key elements in any process of transition to democracy is the reform of the forces of law and order. Under authoritarian rule judiciaries are obliged to enforce the laws and norms of an authoritarian constitutional and legal political order, and with constitutional reform and other legislative changes in the transition from non-democratic rule, they must adapt judicial cultures, jurisprudence and even training, and many judges identified with the “ancient regime” may have to be retired. Similarly, as authoritarian rule is often associated with a very broad role for the military and police in the repression of political opposition, with the transition to democracy one of the key challenges is reforming the structure and governing ideological strategies guiding the action of these institutions, so as to adapt them to a new democratic context in which political pluralism and respect for human rights is an essential component.

The fourth chapter shows how, along with the importance of “elite pacts,” the literature on transitions has always emphasised the key role played by organised civil society actors in pushing liberalisation forward and shaping the politics of transition. As noted by Huntington, “democracy has come as much from the top down as from the bottom up; it is as likely to be the product of oligarchy as of protest against oligarchy.”

The fifth chapter shows how the media is a medium through which political elites disseminate ideas and political projects to the general public. With media liberalization, the message ceases to be simply that of the government, and begins to include a plurality of views about how society should be organized, often giving voice to demands and concerns of groups that were previously “invisible.” Hence, it is the aim of this section to understand the role that the media – both printed and other – have played in the politics of liberalization and transition in these countries and how their experiences might provide lessons for other countries.

The sixth chapter shows how one of the key issues facing any new government in the wake of a transition away from authoritarian repressive rule is how to deal with the legacy of past human rights violations. Its aim is therefore to see how different countries have pursued both official and social memory-making and addressed a past of authoritarian violence, and to understand how these processes have shaped the prospects for democratisation.

The seventh and final chapter shows how the contribution of international actors to processes of transition and democratisation are tremendously varied in scope and effect. The nature of their role depends on internal economic, social and political factors, as well as on the nature of the actors that are involved – foreign governments, international organisations and NGOs, and on the ideological and normative climate of the times. In this light, this chapter examines the role that international actors have played in the countries under study, and what lessons can be derived from these experiences for other democratising societies.

### **3.13. Domestic Politics and Conflict in the Cases of Israel, Palestine and Lebanon**

When analysing conflicts from academic or policy perspectives, conflict parties are often treated as monolithic 'black boxes'. Analysis tends to be centred on relations between principal parties and third party actors both in phases of conflict and peace. In turn, attention is often focussed on the day to day evolution of relations between conflict parties, at the expense of the underlying long-term drivers of conflict and peace, which often lie within conflict parties themselves. This is particularly true in the Middle East, where the succession of crises in the region often leaves analysts and policy-makers little time to reflect upon the structural root drivers of conflict. Stemming from this premise, this study analyses some of the main structural, interest-based and ideational domestic drivers within three conflict parties in the Middle East: Israel, Palestine and Lebanon. On the basis of this analysis, this report examines the extent and manner in which these domestic drivers have impinged upon the ensuing inter-connected conflict hubs in the region; namely the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, between Israel and Lebanon and Syria, and between Syria and Lebanon. The study also discusses how external parties and most importantly EU actors have affected these conflicts by operating – deliberately or not – on their respective domestic drivers. In turn, it concludes by drawing out alternative policy approaches that could assist the EU pursue its oft-quoted objective to contribute and promote peace in the region. In the case of Israel, two long-term ideational goals have shaped the conduct of Israeli policy, impinging upon Israel's relations first and foremost with the Palestinians as well as with Lebanon and Syria. Hence, the first chapter on Israel recounts how the domestic goals of territorial expansion and demographic control and the inherent tension between them have played a key role in shaping the historical evolution of Israel's conflicts in all their successive stages, and most critically before, during and after the Oslo process. Yet in order to understand the significance of these national goals, appreciate their changing conceptualizations, and grasp their permanency despite their seemingly contradictory nature, the structural features characterizing Israel's domestic politics and polity must be scrutinized. This chapter reveals how far from being a 'one-man show', Israel's policy has been determined by a complex balance between different state institutions, their underlying interests, as well as the demographic make-up of the Israeli polity. Hence, while charismatic politicians of either 'hawkish' or 'doveish' inclinations may partially redirect and re-package policy, underlying structural drivers often remain unchanged and have largely explained the long-term continuity of Israeli policy. Only once these drivers are fully grasped, it is possible to comprehend the impact of external parties on the conflict and the reasons why third parties have failed to meaningfully alter long-term conflict dynamics in the region.

The second chapter on Palestine focuses on structural and ideational factors which have shaped the Palestinians' conduct in the conflict with Israel. Structural factors such as the duality between the PA and the PLO, the decline of the secular Fatah

movement, the exclusion of the Islamist factions from the PLO (and until recently the PA), and the rise in popular appeal of Hamas have all had specific effects on the development of the conflict with Israel. Interests and ideologies within both the secular and the Islamist camps, as well as in the loosely defined 'civil society' sector in the Occupied Territories have also had discernible and often negative effects on the conflict. Yet more so than in other principal parties, the conflict itself has had a key impact on internal Palestinian drivers, giving rise to a tangled circular causal relationship between the inside and the outside. This chapter concludes by analysing the impact of EU policies towards Palestine, explaining how more often than not they have exacerbated the domestic Palestinian drivers of the conflict by inducing differentiated empowerment between different sets of domestic actors and their respective political platforms.

**One cannot neglect the effect that relations with Israel and Syria have had on domestic politics in Lebanon, exacerbating dynamics of conflict and confessionalism rather than contributing to transcend these.**

The third chapter examines the case of Lebanon, analysing the sectarian political structures in the country and their ensuing modus operandi and inbuilt incentives. It is explained how these on the one hand have impinged upon relations with both Israel and Syria, and on the other hand have stalled the process of domestic reform in Lebanon itself. Yet, as in the case of Palestine, one cannot neglect the effect that relations with Israel and Syria have had on domestic politics in Lebanon, exacerbating dynamics of conflict and confessionalism rather than contributing to transcend these. The chapter in particular takes the cases of the Syrian withdrawal in 2005 and the Israeli war in Summer 2006 to examine how relations with these two neighbours have impinged upon domestic dynamics in Lebanon. Finally, this chapter turns to third party involvement, principally in the form of UN resolution 1559 in 2004, arguing that far from promoting a de-confessionalization of politics in Lebanon, third parties have tended to either consolidate confessional structures, or risk exacerbating internal polarization and inducing renewed sectarian conflict in the country. The study concludes by drawing some of the major lessons learnt from the three case studies and the manner in which external actors have impacted upon their internal dynamics. These lessons are applied to outline alternative policy approaches which the EU could endorse in order to have a more constructive and long-term influence on the structural domestic drivers fuelling these inter-connected Middle East conflicts.

### **3.14. Islamist Parties in the Maghreb and their Connections with Europe: Growing Influences and the Dynamics of Democratisation**

Legalised Islamist parties in the Maghreb, such as the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP) in Algeria and the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) in Morocco, appear nowadays as potential actors of potential democratization processes. This change of prospect is reinforced by the transformations which political Islam itself has experienced in the past ten years during which many Islamist parties gave up

the revolutionary rhetoric that they used in the 1970s and the 1980s, and chose the legalist option at the beginning of the 1990s. With their inclusion into the official political arena, they became conservative centre-right parties – at a political level with their belonging to the national institutional frames of the Royalty or the Republic and at an economic level through advocacy for liberalism. They present themselves as critical supporters of the ruling powers; on the one hand they are a part of the various governmental coalitions while on the other they are continuously trying to satisfy their electorate by issuing protest statements on issues such as morality or corruption.

These political and ideological evolutions of Islamist parties also affect their connections with the EU and its member states. In the 1980s, Europe was only considered as a sanctuary for exiled Islamists and as a convenient and safe political platform. However, since the mid-Nineties, these parties have tried to frame and in some ways control Muslim communities in Europe. They have done so by presenting themselves as defenders of Muslim European minorities, by launching delocalized political campaigns during the various national elections in order to attract Algerian and Moroccan citizens who live in Europe, and by engaging a foreign relations policy strategy vis-à-vis European policy-makers.

In contrast, political instability in the Maghreb throughout the 1990s, as well as the emergence of the terrorist issue, has led the EU to marginalize Islamist parties, thereby privileging an EMP that is based on security imperatives and that considers Islamists as a threat for peaceful negotiations and initiatives in the region. However, the new post-9/11 American policy of partnership with some legal Islamist parties in Algeria and Morocco seems to have an increasing impact on EU plans as regards the “Islamist challenge”, as Brussels is currently trying to define more flexible modalities of inclusion for these political actors, especially with the objective of a renewal of the democratization process. It is in this light that this study analyses the nature of Islamist parties in Algeria and Morocco and examines their history, their ideologies, their structure, as well as their relations with Europe and the EU in particular.

It is concluded that the partnership that the EU can have with Islamist parties must espouse the sectoral dimension of existing programmes in the region, especially by differentiating the political, social and economic spheres. There is no need to invent new programmes specifically created for Islamist actors and their organisations but simply to encourage their inclusion in the programmes that already exist. However, this work of including them needs to take account of the following points: 1.) The nations which Islamists belong to in Algeria and Morocco have a long history of cooperation with Europe. As a result, their interest in the policies of Europe and its member states is important, as distinct from other Islamist groupings in the Middle East. In spite of that, European policies relating to the region are still not very well known by Islamists. So the EU, especially via its delegations in the countries concerned, should work to step up the visibility of and explain its main

**There is no need to invent new programmes specifically created for Islamist actors and their organisations but simply to encourage their inclusion in the programmes that already exist.**

programmes such as the EMP and the ENP; 2.) The emphasis must be put on the political nature of Islamist actors and their parties, and for that, there is a need to differentiate the political approach of Islamists from a religious or intercultural approach. Hence, exchanges of experience between Maghreb Islamist parties and European foundations/political parties must be promoted both by member states at a national level and by the EU as part of Euro-Mediterranean exchanges; 3.) Ahead of the 2007 elections that will take place in Morocco and Algeria, technical training on managing political projects, running electoral campaigns and on cooperating with national and international institutions should be made available to candidates. Such training actions will also have to be set up for the longer term and must be subsequently open to activists and not just leaders; 4.) The EU must promote work in these countries to strengthen national institutions which do not exclude Islamist parties. Only civil servants chosen by governments have so far benefited from MEDA programmes to strengthen institutions. Therefore, Professional standards, especially via parliamentary dynamics, must be strengthened and cooperation with secular parties promoted; 5.) Islamists are not necessarily religious actors and their inclusion in the Partnership must focus on politics. Nonetheless, many NGOs from civil society and charitable and humanitarian associations share their ideas and have structural links with these parties. These associations, which can be described as Islamic given their religious base, are today also excluded from the partnership with the EU. They can however play a useful role in intercultural initiatives promoted by the EU, especially by relaying Euro-Mediterranean programmes for a culture of peace and dialogue in the mosques, Koranic schools and religious associations; 6.) Islamist parties are now faced with the emergence of new profiles of activists, especially among young people and women, a challenge they do not always know how to meet. Growing in numbers at grassroots level, they are largely in the minority in the representative bodies of parties or parliaments. So there is an internal reform needed in the parties to give young people and women a more central role. The second area for work is to include these young people in the EuroMed Youth Platform and to raise women's awareness of European programmes with a gender aspect. The third area concerns the current transformation of Islamist networks, especially with the emergence of new groups of "business leaders" and trade unions close to this trend. EU programmes should also encourage their participation in the EuroMed Economic Forum and Trade Union Forum. The renewal of Islamist elites via the existence of these new networks will definitely have an important effect on the structural and ideological transformation of Islamist parties in the next ten years.

### **3.15. The Muslim Brotherhood's Success in the 2005 Legislative Elections in Egypt: Reasons and Implications**

In the context of an unprecedented opening of the political system in Egypt in 2004/2005, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) scored an impressive success in the

2005 legislative elections that showed that the mainstream non-violent Islamist movement, despite the legal ban of the movement itself and its political activities, is the only influential and organised political opposition in the face of the veteran National Democratic Party (NDP).

Hence, the objective of this study is two-fold: first to explain the MB's success and second to shed light on its possible implications. In the first part, the study analyzes the reasons for the MB's electoral success based on recent changes in the Egyptian political system. It is being explored how reform measures as well as changes in the political landscape between 2000 and 2005 have helped the MB translate the public support they enjoy into seats in Parliament. It also tries to evaluate the MB's political capacity of dealing with these changes and choosing its strategy accordingly. In the second part, the study examines the implications of the MB's success in Egypt. Here, it aims at finding hints with regards to one of the most salient questions in the debate on political Islam, namely, does the integration of political Islam lead to moderation and further democratization? Has there been an ideological transformation within/of the movement? The study provides insights into this question by analyzing the MB's 2004 reform initiative as well as their 2005 electoral program. Moreover, it will review their parliamentary performance between 2000 and 2005 in order to get an idea of their possible future behaviour. Their parliamentary performance can be evaluated according to specific criteria: use of oversight tools, attendance, disciplinary respect, reaction to national events, the types and importance of issues raised, and the quality of their inquiries as documented. Finally, in the concluding section, scenarios will be developed for the future of the Egyptian political system as well as the MB's role in Egyptian politics and, on this basis, the study provides policy recommendations aimed particularly at the EU and its member states.

The first set of reasons for the MB's success is related to the changes that occurred in the political context. Above all, the first presidential elections that took place in September 2005 had a direct impact on the legislative elections in November the same year: By opening up competition for the post of the president, the election signalled the unprecedented impasse of the regime seeking to patch up its legitimacy. In addition, civic protest movements had emerged that rejected the political system much more fundamentally and called for comprehensive reform. The most important of these has been the dynamic protest movement called the Egyptian Movement for Change, Kifaya. However, as a second set of factors, the regime itself can also be considered a factor in the MB's rising influence: The NDP and government officials have relied heavily on religious arguments; they have oppressed secular or liberal opponents; they have nourished obscurantist religious trends in Al-Azhar and among religious groups; and they have let the MB take charge of welfare services in order to save on the state budget. Also, the regime has allowed Islamist activists to enter trade unions, while reserving the leadership positions for the NDP. There is a third set of reasons for the MB's success which is related to the movement's long term

**Europeans should engage in dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood, but they should above all put pressure on the regime to adhere to the rule of law as well as to change the legal framework in order to allow for the formation of new political parties and political activity.**

strategy to build a societal base: The MB's strategic approach has been to invest in welfare services so as to build a large power base among the population that they are able to mobilize politically. And indeed, not only have many MB candidates gained credibility and respect through their daily contacts with the people, the movement has been investing in the social sphere for more than 30 years. In a society in which 40 percent of the population lives under the poverty line and the political participation rate is only 25 percent, providing services in all vital sectors – education, health, and employment – has proved to be the fastest and most successful way to gain supporters. Fourth, using the religious sphere as a place for political mobilisation has been a successful strategy of the MB. Those affiliated with the MB, members and sympathizers, often saw it as a religious duty to vote for a candidate of the movement. Despite the doubts the slogan "Islam is the solution" raised among many, the MB continued to use it because it wanted to focus on religion as the determining factor for the vote, and because it had gained the trust of the people as being *the* movement representing Islamic identity. On top of this, the movement was able to make use of the unprecedented coincidence of growing internal and external pressures on the regime, by starting open and direct political activity in the name of the movement. The MB has also understood the importance of rallying with other opposition forces, and it has sought coordination with these forces for creating more pressure on the regime. Related to this is another important factor for the MB's success: its organisational capacity.

While the MB has opted to participate peacefully in the political process in Egypt, it remains unclear as to whether it represents a genuine democratic force or if it will use the democratic opening to pursue an authoritarian agenda. Still, participation in the political system has already transformed the movement. During the 2005 election campaign the concepts of "democracy" and "political participation" found their way into the MB's rhetoric and, most importantly, into its political strategies of creating grassroot networks for popular support. The experience of elaborating a political programme for the legislative elections pushed the movement to publicly clarify its positions on concepts such as party pluralism – something that had previously been refused in some trends of Islamic thought as "al-tahazzub" (partisanship) with the argument that Islam calls for unity of the nation rather than its fragmentation. The MB can be considered to be part of Egypt's reform forces, but that is primarily so because it agrees with other political reformers on the tools for bringing about reforms: rule of law, good governance and free elections.

In this view, European strategies aiming at political reform in Egypt cannot avoid dealing with the existing regime, and at the same time cannot ignore the popular support for the Islamists. Europeans should engage in dialogue with the MB, but they should above all put pressure on the regime to adhere to the rule of law as well as to change the legal framework in order to allow for the formation of new political parties and political activity. Europeans should also support other civic movements in their struggle to open up the political system.



### **3.16. The Political Integration of Islamist Movements through Democratic Elections: The Case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Hamas in Palestine**

Throughout the last years, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Hamas in Palestine have entered the political arena and became increasingly influential political actors, a development that culminated in Hamas' election victory in early 2006. Against this background, this study sets out to undertake a comparative analysis of their origins and evolutions, as well as their gradual, in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, and their strong, in the case of Hamas, integration into the political system.

The study reveals that the movements developed from different starting points and based on different rationales. While the Muslim Brotherhood clearly resembles other (non-violent) Islamist movements that came into existence in the 1960s, Hamas distinguishes itself mainly due to its character as a liberation movement that has been using force to fight occupation.

With respect to their democratic credentials, the study argues that unless the Egyptian regime introduces real democratic reforms and unless both the EU and the US are pushing Israel to end occupation, none of the movements will adhere to truly democratic values and commit itself to the commonly accepted rules of the international system. In particular as far as Hamas is concerned, the study shows that the West's approach, i.e. the EU's and the US's approach vis-à-vis the democratically elected Hamas, is detrimental as it will only reinforce the latter's opposition to engage, if only informally, with Israel, and add to the widespread perception in the southern Mediterranean and the Middle East of Western double standards. Undoubtedly, the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas have treated the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict differently since the Oslo Accords were adopted. The abolition of the EU's and US' negligence to engage with Hamas may open new avenues as regards issues such as citizen's rights, equality, justice and the respect for other religions.

It goes without saying that the Muslim Brotherhood's domestic situation is more problematic simply because it is still considered by the Egyptian government as illegal. In contrast to Hamas, it is much more religious as its objectives are not only strictly political but also religious and thus it aims always at pleasing god. Due to this profile, but also due to its appeal to the Egyptian masses, the regime feels unable to fully incorporate, and thus legalise, the Brotherhood into the political system. Yet, even if it did not pose a threat to the regime, in order to be legalised it would have to define its character more clearly and abandon its religious underpinnings as they are in sharp contradiction with the Egyptian constitution. Its integration, however, is the only solution to guarantee the creation of a new civil political elite that is able to compete with more fundamentalist Islamists in potentially free and transparent elections. In that regard, a democratic context, once established through political reforms, would thus have a positive effect as it would generate a greater diversity of political actors capable of playing the political game according to democratic rules.

**Unless the Egyptian regime introduces real democratic reforms and unless both the EU and the US are pushing Israel to end occupation, none of the movements will commit itself to truly democratic values and commonly accepted rules of the international system.**

Both movements resemble each other to the extent that they both oppose Israel and seem to be unwilling to abandon this position, at least for the time being. Hamas' election victory, however, clearly shows that it has gradually, but repeatedly moved away from its charta of 1988. Undoubtedly, this proves the movement's ability to adapt to political realities, but nonetheless leaves open whether it can change even further and whether the Brotherhood can and will follow that example.

### **3.17. Youth as Actors of Political Reform in the Southern Mediterranean**

**Effective youth policies, and thus a truly holistic and all-in-encompassing EMP, have to take into account the reality of youth and the challenges that young people face, but also need to link these realities with the political developments in their countries in the southern Mediterranean.**

It is somewhat surprising and thus rather noteworthy that the youth as part of civil society development and finally political reform has been ignored by the EMP's political and security partnership. The Euro-Mediterranean Youth Action Programme which was initiated in 1999, as part of the EMP's third basket, addressed the youth and has been successful in promoting youth exchanges and thus combating prejudices and stereotypes that prevail across the Euro-Mediterranean area and persistently determined mutual perceptions. Yet, as is the case with all other programmes in the third basket, the youth is not being seen as a true resource and therefore ignored as an actor that may positively influence socio-economic and political development in the southern Mediterranean. This takes place against the background of problematic demographic developments in the Arab EMP partner countries, most of which are characterised by societies in which approximately 60 percent of the population are below the age of 30. It is in this light that a survey on the issue of participation of the youth in the political process in Mediterranean partner countries was conducted. The study is based on a shared agreement to understand youth both as a code and resource for the future of societies, regardless of whether they are in Europe or the southern Mediterranean. Effective youth policies, and thus a truly holistic and all-in-encompassing EMP, have to take into account the reality of youth and the challenges that young people face, but also need to link these realities with the political developments in their countries in the southern Mediterranean. In this vein, and considering that the youth represent the vast majority, and thus a non-negligible political force, in the societies in the southern Mediterranean, this study analyses the role of youth as actors of political development and reform in the southern Mediterranean in the framework of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, thereby trying to shed some light on the role of external actors, such as the EU and the Council of Europe, in their efforts to strengthen civil society and democratic development in the Euro-Mediterranean area.

This study focuses on the three Mashreq countries, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon; the questionnaire is qualitative and contains some quantitative elements, as well as elements related to the "Maastricht Watch" rationale. The relevant sample groups to which the questionnaire was disseminated are approximately forty Arab youth leaders from the three countries.

The study conveyed a broad consensus over the actuality that youth participation is imperative for the improvement of public life, political development and reform in the southern Mediterranean. It also substantiated the fact that young people demonstrate a vast interest in assuming more societal responsibilities in addition to taking part in and contributing to political development.

According to the study, establishing and reinforcing a reasonable youth participation platform requires a substantial amount of work. Matters, such as bridging the gap between young people's participation and political institutions, informing youth about the importance of their role in the reform process, as well as facilitating participation opportunities through the identification of the main participation channels are undoubtedly the most appropriate initiating steps that should be undertaken in that regard. Furthermore, the study stresses the need to enlighten young people with respect to their public role and argues that in the absence of any encouragement by existing rulers the former need to become proactive and act as full citizens. Given that they are the major component of society, this implies that they should also be included in the decision-making process, thus breaking with restricted concepts of policy making.

The study recommends that young people in the southern Mediterranean should be regarded primarily as a reformist cohort and not as force that aims at destabilising and undermining existing political establishments. According to the report, this would imply a shift away from the policies of cooptation and assimilation to policies of participation and integration.

### **3.18. Benchmarking Human Rights and Democratic Development within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership**

The purpose of this study is to design a framework for the evaluation of progress within the EMP in the broad category of human rights – political and civil rights – and democratic development. The basic assumption underlying the benchmarking system proposed towards this end is that objectively monitoring progress towards commonly formulated goals is a tool that can be used towards the achievement of such goals. Monitoring is thus regarded as a partnership-building instrument, and this approach presided over the identification of the key priority-areas earmarked for benchmarking, and the associated selection of appropriate indicators.

The study contains two parts: the first part discusses the usefulness of monitoring against the background of existing political dialogue frameworks, proposes the appropriate methodology and identifies the set of areas/priorities for a common benchmarking system whereas the second part discusses in depth the types of indicators through which progress in the identified areas/priorities should be evaluated.

**The notion of co-ownership is essential in determining the criteria, defining standards and norms and explicitly clarifying values and targets for the evaluation of progress towards a future Euro-Mediterranean Community.**

In the report prepared for the 2005 Barcelona Summit outlining its vision of a future Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States, EuroMeSCo stressed that measuring progress towards the fulfilment of the common objectives stated in the Barcelona Declaration would “require regular monitoring with clear indicators and benchmarks, allowing for an assessment of the evolution towards mutually agreed goals”. An emphasis on incentives on the part of the EU was also recommended, in the form of clearly indicating to southern partners what they would “gain by engaging in reforms – such as a stake in the single market based on all four freedoms, including the free movement of people.” In line with this approach, the following elements constitute the foundation of the benchmarking system proposed in this study: A genuine dialogue between partners is needed to build a common language, a common understanding leading to common definitions and norms, and common criteria governing membership in a regional community. The EMP’s political dialogue must be based on a balanced system of regional governance, shared responsibility, and co-ownership. Particularly the notion of co-ownership is essential in determining the criteria, defining standards and norms and explicitly clarifying values and targets for the evaluation of progress towards a future Euro-Mediterranean Community.

The benchmarking system designed in this study to measure progress in human rights and democratic development should be applied as a partnership-building instrument, for it assumes shared responsibility, the right to mutual scrutiny and reciprocal obligations.

The study is grounded on the main reference documents governing Euro-Mediterranean relations, on the basis of which a systematic listing of the areas/priorities which are clearly expressed was drawn. The four reference documents are the following: a) the Barcelona Declaration, b) the Association Agreements, c) the Five-Year Work Programme adopted at the tenth Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit, d) the ENP Action Plans. The crossing and regrouping of formulated targets makes it possible to identify the following key areas/priorities which are crucial to evaluating progress in the political chapter of the EMP:

(1) human rights commitment; (2) right to physical integrity; (3) political participation ; (4) rule of law ; (5) civil liberties; (6) civil society; (7) women’s empowerment and rights; (8) migrants and minority rights.

As regards monitoring progress in the area of human rights and democratic development, it is necessary to associate, besides officials, stakeholders and members of the civil society in order to ensure the acceptability of the established benchmarking system. It is crucial that all official and non-official actors are involved in designing a common framework, and develop from the beginning a “culture” of joint ownership. Shared responsibility must intervene in the very early stages in the process of elaborating the common framework.

The benchmarking system that is proposed in this study relies primarily on a combination of existing indicators available from a variety of well-reputed sources as building a set of indicators from scratch would have required an inordinate amount of time and resources and would serve no other purpose than duplicating existing work.

### **3.19. Benchmarking Democratic Development in the Euro-Mediterranean Area: Conceptualising Ends, Means, and Strategies**

This study sets out to critically assess the EU's objective of introducing a benchmarking process in the realm of human rights and democratic development within its Mediterranean policy. It starts by drawing the attention to the conceptual and analytical difficulties related to the endeavour of 'benchmarking' human rights and democratic governance, which are viewed as having a number of important *practical* implications. Indeed, conceptual clarity regarding the idea of benchmarking democratisation and human rights is absolutely necessary in order to avoid incoherence and prevent counter-productive results. In this vein, the first chapter of this study starts by discussing the analytical difficulties related to, and the persisting debates revolving around, a number of key concepts in the realm of democratisation and human rights, such as the notion of 'democracy', 'rule of law', and 'human rights' – terms which are often employed without providing clear definitions. While subsequently problematising the process of *democratic transition*, the chapter ends with a discussion of the similarly diffuse notion of 'benchmarking', and the necessary ingredients of any successful benchmarking process. The second chapter shifts the focus of attention to the objective of benchmarking democratic development and human rights in the Euro-Mediterranean context. This chapter first discusses the gradual introduction of benchmarking in the EU's external relations in general, and the ENP in particular, and subsequently provides an analysis of the 'first round' of ENP Action Plans concluded with the Mediterranean partner states in 2004. Considering the conceptual difficulties revolving around the promotion of 'democracy' and human rights on the one hand, and the minimum requirements of benchmarking on the other, this chapter raises the question of whether the Action Plans concluded with Morocco, Tunisia, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, and Israel are useful examples of 'benchmarking' in practice. As the Action Plans point to a number of conceptual and practical flaws, the third chapter proposes to take the conceptualisation of democratisation as, indeed, a process that entails different phases as a starting point of any democracy promotion strategy. While defining the respect for human rights as the first, and most essential, building block of democratic development, the conceptualisation of democratisation also entails a high compatibility with the dynamic nature of any benchmarking process. With the necessary reservations, such a scheme may be used as a 'check list' of sorts in a cross-country comparison. More importantly, it may serve as a 'meta-scheme' within which specific indicators

**While defining the respect for human rights as the first, and most essential, building block of democratic development, the conceptualisation of democratisation also entails a high compatibility with the dynamic nature of any benchmarking process.**

and ‘benchmarks’ in the realm of ‘human rights’ or ‘the rule of law’ – as used by different international organizations – may be defined and evaluated in the specific context of Euro-Mediterranean relations, as undertaken by other authors. The report concludes with a number of recommendations with respect to the need for conceptual clarity regarding the objectives of the EU’s democratization strategy (‘democracy’ versus some sort of ‘political liberalisation’), the need for periodic monitoring, and the importance of making relevant EU policies coherent with each other, the need to focus on democratisation *processes* and their phases for any benchmarking strategy, the non-negotiability of human rights, the necessity to increase the incentives - along with the use of conditionality, and the indispensable role to be played by the civil society of the partner states within any EU democracy promotion strategy.

**Particularly the media played an important role during the crisis in that some newspapers instrumentalised the publication of the cartoons in order to justify the alleged and actually unjustified clash of civilizations theory while others tried to report and discuss the issue in a very moderate and balanced way.**

### **3.20. The Cartoons Crisis and Reactions in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership**

This study is based on a questionnaire that was sent to twenty key experts working on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership with the aim to identify the attitudes, perceptions and approaches of the different countries of the EMP adopted during the cartoons row.

The survey has proven once more that freedom of speech was at the core of the entire debate in the countries of the EU. While the Danish government was very articulate as regards defending the principle of freedom of speech, the governments of other EU countries linked it to principles and norms, such as the respect for the Other, and freedom of religion and dialogue. With respect to public opinion in Europe, the study shows that there is a divide with respect to those that were more in favour of respect for religion and those that advocated freedom of speech without any limits.

With respect to reactions in the southern Mediterranean, freedom of speech and respect for religion were the keywords also in the South as both governments, as well as religious leaders stressed this dualism constantly. Furthermore, and in contrast to reactions in Europe, they strongly condemned the publication of the caricatures, and also the subsequent violence in places like Damascus and Beirut.

The study could further show that particularly the media played an important role during the crisis in that some newspapers instrumentalised the publication of the cartoons in order to justify the alleged and actually unjustified clash of civilizations theory while others tried to report and discuss the issue in a very moderate and balanced way. This stands in sharp contrast to the role of academic experts and cultural actors who in principle had a negligible influence on the debate and development of events.



Most importantly, the study confirmed the ongoing, if not increasing, existence of stereotypes vis-à-vis the Other, as well as the popularity of the Huntingtonian model, so successfully promoted by the tabloid press and propagandist actors. Somewhat unsurprisingly, the study also reiterated the view of many that neither EU policy tools nor the EMP were able to contribute to a reduction of tensions nor to play any substantial role at all. With this in view, the majority of respondents to the survey stressed the need for more efficiency and unity in the EU's foreign policy, as well as the importance of making EU institutions more sensitive to similar crises, simply in order to be able to react accordingly. This presupposes a debate on the notion of freedom of speech and its limits, in conjunction with the creation of an inter-religious dialogue between the Occident and the Muslim world with the objective to contribute to the fight against racism and stereotypes. This needs to be supplemented by new school and television programmes that could help provide a better knowledge of the Arab and thus predominantly Muslim world. This, however, goes hand in hand with the media, as well as the political elite, developing what could be called an ethical responsibility, and European governments finally implementing improved integration policies towards Muslim communities. Finally, the last conclusion that can be derived from the respondents' replies is the need for the EMP states to work towards the full abolition of any form of censure and the introduction of some legal restrictions that may protect religious beliefs without violating the rights of others.

### **3.21. Getting it Right: Inclusion within Diversity – Lessons of the Cartoons Crisis and Beyond**

The study analyses the role of inter-cultural initiatives in the process of building a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States, on the basis of an assessment of the so-called “cartoons crisis” and the “clash of civilisations” debate. The study focuses on xenophobia and intolerance and the growing popularity of “culturalist” theories such as the “clash of civilizations” and pro-“identity” politics in the North and South. It looks at new forms of intolerance and xenophobia, notably “Islamophobia”. The “cartoons crisis” originated in Denmark, and reflects the growth in a number of European countries of a new current of xenophobia based on a view that cultural and political identity is being threatened by immigrants and their descendants, particularly by Muslims. It also reflects the persistence in some countries of the South of extremist groups with “identity-based” ideologies, and the behaviour of some political leaders that are willing to adopt the same kinds of positions in order to boost their short-run standing. The “cartoons crisis” confirms that intolerance towards that which is different has become a key element in populist politics in the North and South of the Mediterranean, and that there is a worrying tendency for concepts such as “levels of tolerance” towards the integration of immigrants to enter the mainstream. The future of Euro-Mediterranean relations and of the envisaged Community of Democratic States, and even of democracy and European integration depend largely on finding the right response to cultural intolerance and discrimination.

**The debate in Europe and in the southern Mediterranean over the caricatures of Mohammed, first published by Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten, took on the proportions of a crisis for essentially political reasons.**



The study argues that the debate in Europe and in the southern Mediterranean over the caricatures of Mohammed, first published by Danish newspaper *Jyllands Posten*, took on the proportions of a crisis for essentially political reasons. It was political in Denmark as part of the tension between the Muslim communities and the xenophobe extreme right, and in the same way it was political in the Middle East, as the matter was instrumentalised in the context of the debate on political reform and Syrian-Lebanese tensions. The crisis was also political in the sense that it reflected accumulated tensions over the war in Iraq, the Palestinian question, terrorist acts in Europe, and the unilateral actions of the Bush administration. Religious feelings and negative perceptions of “the other” were mobilised for short-term political gains, in the South and to a certain extent also in the North.

The “clash of civilisations” theory has been accepted to explain reactions in the North and the South to the Danish cartoons, making the political and social realities underlying the crisis to become imperceptible. This leads to a dangerous conflation and with it the perception of an immense and radical revolt involving a whole “civilisation.” The enormous mutual ignorance of political realities in the North and the South permitted both sides to make gross generalisations about the other and accept stereotypical images of two putatively monolithic, opposed worlds. Civilisational explanations only serve to feed xenophobia and stereotyping by associating whole regions and societies or entire religions with specific attitudes, and to bipolarise relations in the Mediterranean by identifying “civilisations” as political actors, be it negatively (preaching confrontation) or positively (calling for dialogue). Instead, the study points out that the focus must be on political and social realities and not on “civilisations” as real social and political problems underlie existing crises, not civilisations.

It is argued in this study that one of the first steps that must be taken to ensure that policies are appropriate is to “get it right” when interpreting current realities. The key word here is differentiation: differentiating between states, between different political groups within states, between political movements, between religious feelings and political behaviour, and even between different religious actors. Once one begins to break down all encompassing categories into specific and differentiated realities, it becomes clear that the concepts of “Islamic world” and “West” are misleading and only serve to contribute to reinforcing stereotypes. Hence, the study emphasises five points: a) Targeting the right issues means clearly defining one’s goals, and then working out which actions best further those goals; b) Freedom does not come from the politics of culture, but from the politics of reform and democratisation; c) Cultural diversity is not the same as normative relativism, and human rights are, indeed, “human”; d) Not all conflicts are a security problem; e) Freedom of expression is a key instrument in the fight against intolerance; f) Freedom of Speech is not the same as hate speech.

In light of these challenges to the “conventional wisdom”, the study recommends four EMP initiatives to promote “inclusion within diversity”, namely the establishment

of an EMP (1) Anti-intolerance and Anti-Xenophobia Initiative; (2) a Migrants' Rights Charter; (3) a Racism and Xenophobia Knowledge Facility; and (4) the reorientation of the ALF to promote Artistic and Intellectual Freedom in the Euro-Mediterranean area.

### **3.22. Conclusions**

Undoubtedly, 2006 proved to be another difficult year for the EMP and the somewhat positive spirit some (mainly southern) European leaders tried to inject at the Barcelona Summit, held in Barcelona on 27-28 November 2005 to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration, evaporated even faster than most of the EMP's staunchest critics had forecasted. Compared with the first ten years of 'Barcelona', as was stated in the introduction, 2006 was particularly rich in armed conflict and domestic violence in the southern Mediterranean area and characterised not only by the end of the PLO's power monopoly in Palestine but also by what became known as the "cartoons row" and its temporarily rapid fallout in the Euro-Mediterranean area. In a way, these developments put the slightly renovated EMP and the new tools that were adopted in Barcelona, such as the new governance facility, the five-years work programme and the code of conduct on terrorism, as well as the young ENP, instantly at test. In retrospect, however, it must be concluded that none of them could yet contribute positively and alleviate the situation on the ground. While it is argued by some that this is not surprising given the 35 partners inability to adopt a common position at the Summit (or before) regarding the grave crises affecting the region and the EU members states widely varying levels of commitment to the EMP, manifest in the equally varying levels of concern with the consequences of a worsening of the political situation particularly in the eastern Mediterranean and the eventual failure of the ambitious Euro-Mediterranean regional integration project, others may point to the insurmountability of the regions' problems and the enormous challenge they present to any external actor. Furthermore, as was already stated by EuroMeSCo in the second issue of its e-news in 2005, as the partners failed to adopt a common declaration with a strong commitment to democratisation and social cohesion, the EMP did not contribute to spreading the idea among southern publics that their deepest political and social demands were taken into account at the event.

In a way and as could be seen in this report, the EuroMeSCo research and information programme 2005/2006, taking the regional dynamics into account, is a reflection of these developments and has pro-actively contributed through its reports, its regular newsletter and its website to a further understanding of the issues at stake and to an initiation and broadening of the relevant debate(s). In the light of its objective to increase confidence between, as well as among, all Euro-Mediterranean partners, all of its activities, publications and thus recommendations are characterised by an explicit North-South dimension and, as outlined above, either deal directly with or touch upon highly timely issues such as conflict prevention,

**The partners failed to adopt a common declaration with a strong commitment to democratisation and social cohesion, the EMP did not contribute to spreading the idea among southern publics that their deepest political and social demands were taken into account at the event.**

(sub-)regional cooperation, migrants as actors in the EMP, Islamist parties, women as full participants in the EMP, political reforms and democracy promotion, and benchmarking.

With respect to the latter, the EuroMeSCo report published in 2005 and entitled *Barcelona Plus. Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States* suggested the setting-up of a system, based on clear indicators and benchmarks, as well as a detailed annual review by the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference, that allows all partners to regularly monitor progress in the southern Mediterranean countries. Not least due to the high-level endorsement of the above mentioned five-year work programme that outlines some concrete measures and instruments to support processes of political transition, the introduction of a mitigated form of benchmarking (in the framework of the ENP) and the so-called “facility for political reform”, the latter of which is yet still imprecise as regards implementation, tools and its linkage with the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), the two EuroMeSCo reports on benchmarking clearly take up this plea and present some very noteworthy and rather overdue recommendations, the first of which relates to shared responsibility.

As the ENP and thus the Action Plans have repeatedly been accused of unilateral imposition by the EU, one of the major recommendations EuroMeSCo puts forward is the necessity to associate, besides officials, stakeholders and members of the civil society in order to ensure the acceptability of the established benchmarking system. It is crucial that all official and non-official actors are involved in designing a common framework, and develop from the beginning a “culture” of joint ownership. While this has to be the very first step of any benchmarking effort, conceptual clarity needs to be the second one. If the EU through the ENP and the EMP via its governance facility is indeed serious in wanting to support human rights and democratisation in the southern Mediterranean through a benchmarking approach, it is essential to first define what it is that it wants to promote. Unfortunately, ENP documents refer to democracy, reform, rule of law, and liberalisation interchangeably, but these terms are not synonymous. In this context, it is being pointed out that both benchmarking and democratisation are *processes*. Hence, in order to develop an appropriate benchmarking process in the realm of democracy and human rights, thinking of democratisation as a process that goes through different phases is analytically extremely useful. As each phase is characterised by different elements and ‘thresholds’, a focus on process not only permits to compare the status of democratisation and human rights in a cross-country perspective. It also enables to address the weak points of a specific country in a systematic manner.

Moreover, although the Actions Plans are supposed to set out the priorities of bilateral relations over the next three to five years, neither they nor any of the Commission’s relevant documents stipulate a clear-cut time frame for the monitoring of progress or potential setbacks. As a regular evaluation and assessment of the agreed benchmarks is inherent in any (intelligent) benchmarking process, and thus key to

the success of the entire undertaking, it is essential to update the ENP and the Action Plans in that regard and incorporate clearly defined time horizons according to which all developments under scrutiny are being assessed.

In the post-9/11 climate, the increasing limitation of civil liberties for the sake of combating terrorism has become a global phenomenon, also affecting Euro-Mediterranean relations. This development may well be co-responsible for some inconsistencies detected within the EU's democratisation strategy vis-à-vis the southern Mediterranean partners in 2006. However, this report stresses the necessity of engaging the partner governments in effectively protecting core human rights. While human rights should be defined, and treated, as the *sine qua non* condition of Euro-Mediterranean relations, the protection of human rights must be considered as a first step towards a real process of democratisation.

The definition of 'priorities for action' in the framework of the Action Plans has been negotiated with governments, which were quite successful in defending their prerogatives. This fact partly explains the pronounced inconsistency in the Action Plans, along with the extreme selective way of addressing some human rights and democratisation issues, but not others. Civil society and in particular human rights organisations in the partner countries are undoubtedly far more credible when it comes to defining human rights and democratisation priorities. These organisations do not only have more expertise on the situation of the respective state, but they are also able to define clear priorities in support of democratisation and the respect for human rights. While the civil society organisations in the partner states are called upon developing such a clear list of priorities to present in Brussels, it is imperative, on the other hand, that the EU develops a far stronger, and preferably institutionalised, type of relations with civil society in the partner countries.

The inclusion, and eventually integration, of civil society must not only be limited to benchmarking efforts, but, in fact, must be applied to the entire EMP. This was acknowledged by the Barcelona Summit in November 2005 that recognized for the first time migrants as important actors in the process of Euro-Mediterranean inclusion. Following up on the five-year work programme's stipulation to promote "legal migration opportunities, work towards the facilitation of the legal movement of individuals, recognising that these constitute an opportunity for economic growth and a means of improving links between countries, fair treatment and integration policies for legal migrants, and facilitate the flow of remittance transfers and address 'brain drain'", this year's EuroMeSCo report on migrant communities in the EMP stresses that this development clearly denotes a positive departure from the language and the spirit of the conclusions reached ten years ago. Yet, it also remarks that this new rhetoric is far from announcing a decisive shift in EU policies or indeed attitudes. For instance, discrimination of migrants and migrant communities in Europe is still ongoing and it is therefore of utmost importance to grant migrants the same political rights and to raise awareness among European citizens of the various benefits migration implies. In the post-9/11 climate, it is furthermore important to regard migrants as potential actors

of (inter-)cultural dialogue and carriers of awareness-raising for the “Other” that can contribute to help demystify other belief systems, most notably Islam, and unmask unjustified and apologetic theories such as the clash of civilizations. In the framework of the EMP, EuroMeSCo calls upon the 35 partners to finally realise the value of migrants and their communities for socio-economic development in Europe and the southern Mediterranean alike. In the light of the enormous amounts of remittances transferred by migrants to their communities in the southern Mediterranean, the EU is well-advised to rethink its relevant financial instruments with the aim of making them more flexible in order to accommodate for these resources and to channel them in a more target-oriented fashion. In addition to being economic actors of (co-) development, it is essential for migrants and their communities that European and southern Mediterranean societies appreciate and thus recognise what can be called “associative mobilisation”, i.e. the impact migrants’ participation can have on the political debates both in their country of residence on issues such as integration, immigration and social justice, and on the politics of migration and thus the process of political modernisation in their countries of origin.

In particular with respect to political modernisation and thus political reforms, the EU in the last years has been increasingly putting democracy promotion on its Euro-Mediterranean agenda, as is reflected by the ENP and the adoption of the governance facility, but also, though rather cautiously, through the first basket of the EMP, and nowadays portrays itself as an ambitious force in this field. With this in view, the relevant EuroMeSCo reports that were drafted in 2006 analysed the EU’s democracy promotion efforts in the southern Mediterranean from different angles and on the basis of different case studies. Yet, they all have in common that they try to identify the scope and room for manoeuvre of the EU, as well as the areas and actors which need to be targeted if EU policies are to be successful and sustainable. As is well-known, the contribution of international actors, such as the EU, to processes of domestic political transformation is tremendously varied in scope and effect. Their role depends on the particular combination of internal and external economic, social and political circumstances, the foreign actors involved, on the mode of intervention or policies that are adopted, on the relationship between foreign and domestic players, and on the ideological and normative climate of the times. Hence, it is important to point out that it is hard to generalise about the impact of external interventions of any kind, ranging from sanctions to quiet diplomacy, as these are fraught with pitfalls, and success often depends on the qualities of leadership and other unpredictable factors on the domestic or external front. The conventional wisdom is that international actors play a secondary and supportive role in processes of political change, and that domestic players are determinant. However, as various socio-political and economic trends which promote increasing interdependence and increasingly interweave domestic and foreign dimensions show, this affirmation has been prone to shift and change over time. In the Euro-Mediterranean context, but also beyond, the debate about democracy-promotion has lately moved from the issue of legitimacy to the issue of efficiency. However,

as this year's EuroMeSCo reports on this subject reveal, a rather high degree of confusion is indeed observed, with variants that cannot be completely accounted for by the local context in the southern Mediterranean, but rather have to do with changing environmental circumstances, and security remaining the *ultima ratio* of local strategic thinking. At the same time some social and political changes are undeniably under way, with an immediate effect to disturb previously designed schemes of stabilisation, and a major challenge for the EU and its EMP therefore relates to the ability of existing political forces, be they local or external, secular or religious, to manage reforms without violence. As the Iraqi experiment has shown how difficult it can be to involve local leaders and elites at a late stage to take over on democracy-building, the EU is prone to privilege a "fine tuning" approach, systematically assessing to what extent the democratic imperative is sustainable against other foreign policy priorities. In times of utter political crisis, the democratic rhetoric thus remains at the heart of EU and, in fact, Western political discourses regarding the southern Mediterranean, but policy practices can quickly adopt a repressive twist which could easily encourage authoritarian relapses. Hence, the EU should take advantage of the democratic momentum that is presently observable in the region thereby focusing better on local political conditions so as to adapt its strategies and methodologies. In particular the quality of local democratic partnerships is essential to ensure the ownership of democratic objectives in the long run, which underlines the need to identify those local actors that might be in a position to induce real change.

With respect to local actors and civil society, the EMP, as was pointed out by the EuroMeSCo report on Women as Full Participants in the Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States, has failed to frame relations between states in the light of two key realities: first, it has failed to recognise that women are not merely subsidiary actors but rather central actors in processes of political transformation, and second, that Islamism, as an immensely varied phenomenon, cannot be either seen as a single, undifferentiated phenomenon and merely repressed or sidelined from processes of political change. Hence, framing policies and initiatives according to the view that women, as representing half of the population in the Euro-Mediterranean area, are central actors in any process of political and socio-economic change is a precondition for a responsive and all-inclusive EMP that takes realities into account. With this in view, and in compliance with the relevant international initiatives and conventions, it is appropriate to mainstream the rights of women into all official EMP policies. This, however, implies that the promotion of the rights and participation of women cannot be seen from a classic North-South cooperation perspective, but must be treated more as a Euro-Mediterranean challenge simply because patriarchy and discrimination are a reality in both Europe and the southern Mediterranean, and there are cross-cutting issues of concern for women North and South, most notably the problems of relativism, gender violence, and the rights of women in immigrant communities and as members of migrant populations.

Moreover, Euro-Mediterranean governments must take full advantage of the governance facility to make the rights of women a priority in the ENP's Action Plans. However, as this means providing adequate means to finance actions, and the establishment of a gender-specific system of benchmarking with clear evaluation and monitoring criteria for periodic evaluations, initiatives, such as the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean gender-disaggregated knowledge base, the establishment of a Women's Rights Council in charge of proposing mainstreaming, rights promotion policies and benchmarks, as well as a scheduled commitment to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and relevant UN human rights conventions with stronger regional and national monitoring mechanisms, are much needed. These measures should go hand in hand with a regular judicial, jurisprudential and law enforcement dialogue and cooperation, as well as awareness-raising measures, such as a Euro-Mediterranean Literacy campaign to eliminate illiteracy among women by 2015 – the Millennium Development Goals Year eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education –, gendered university exchange programmes, human rights training courses and the creation of a women of the year prize that should be awarded annually to the southern or northern organisation or individual deemed to have made the greatest contribution to promoting the rights of women, with a particular emphasis on actions and initiatives that demonstrate the compatibility between the advancement of women's rights and religious belief, and with special attention to the contribution of immigrant women.

Finally, another important step is to focus as much on bottom-up as on top-down reform. This means making a real commitment to the empowerment of civil society, particularly women's rights groups and it also implies taking Islamist women's movements on board, and supporting a dialogue between different currents of the women's rights movement.

In general, non-violent Islamist movements and Islamist parties are still overwhelmingly viewed as dangerous and violent opposition movements in Europe, and, as several EuroMeSCo studies published in 2006 show, there is no real dialogue between them and the EU. Such parties are often labeled as and repressed for being subversive and dangerous within their countries of origin by regimes that are averse to opening the political arena and long standing nationalist elites unwilling to relinquish their hold on power. However, as the case of Egypt's 2005 parliamentary elections, the victory of Hamas in Palestine, and the impressive results of the PJD in the Moroccan parliamentary elections in 2002 show, democratization may lead to a greater presence of Islamist parties in the political game. As a consequence, if Europe and the EU are serious about democratization in the southern Mediterranean, they must change their attitudes vis-à-vis them. In this vein, one of the greatest challenges for EU policy-makers is to understand the duality or paradoxical nature of political Islamism, as opponents of an authoritarian status quo *and* defenders of what are often very conservative projects, many of which have undemocratic undertones.



Many Islamist parties are open to competitive elections, pragmatic, and accept state legality; however, they also espouse views that are seen as antithetical to pluralistic democracy. Another big cleavage between Islamist parties that must be understood is not so much that between parties that are in favour of democracy and those that are not, but between the degree to which such parties or movements are dominated either by their religious or political functions. Hence, European parties and foundations should get engaged in a gradual rapprochement and an exchange of experiences with a view to enlarge their potential interlocutors for reform in the southern Mediterranean. It is furthermore being recommended to include interested (non-violent) Islamist movements into the EU's inter-cultural initiatives and programmes and to integrate them in the Euro-Med Platform with a view to help relevant NGOs to foster mutual understanding and develop a broader and more inclusive network of cooperation.

In principle, the importance of civil society's role in cooperation and, as a matter of fact, regional dialogue, must be emphasised and the fact that this cannot materialise in the absence of democratic reforms in the southern Mediterranean is increasingly obvious. As is pointed out by the two current EuroMeSCo reports on regional cooperation in the Maghreb and the southern Mediterranean respectively that were presented in this report, the conceptual logic of cooperation has it that once cooperation begins, it can thereafter have a pacifying effect on regional conflicts, such as the Western Sahara conflict or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Therefore, encouraging these dynamics may have a positive effect in the long term on the very conflicts that are viewed as having a major negative impact on an array of regional dynamics. In this regard, some very few EU programs in the South have been playing an important role in the implementation of many reforms, either socio-political (such as the Family Code and more freedom of expression in Morocco), economic (free trade exchange between the EU and some southern partners), or socio-educative, and such EU initiatives are cornerstones for enhancing regional cooperation in the Mediterranean. Yet, the EU will have to recognize that it is in its interest to do more to directly promote these dynamics, which is not a trivial matter. But, enhancing Europe's own conception of security – that highlights collective mutually reinforcing dynamics – should translate into taking clear steps to encourage dialogue among the southern partners. Hence, the EU needs to do more to devise plans and allocate more funds for this purpose, perhaps beginning with the convening of a region-wide Track II initiative. Moreover, taking regional security cooperation in the South seriously means being willing to take a broader view of the "South". For example, to begin seriously considering how the question of Iran, and the threat that it poses to many in the region, fits into such a conception of European and Euro-Mediterranean regional thinking. There are some initial indications that Iran is an issue that could spark greater interest in regional security dialogue, but certainly this should not be excluded from a wider view of regional security cooperation in the Middle East (including Persian Gulf states) and North Africa simply because of the present configuration of the Barcelona Process.

New security threats, the July war, as well as the violent power struggle in the Palestinian Territories, have sparked renewed interest in the issue of Euro-Mediterranean conflict prevention. While conflict prevention is not perceived in the southern Mediterranean as a precondition for creating security, stability and prosperity for individual countries and their citizens, it is seen in Europe as a necessity, mainly because the continued stability and success of the EU is dependent on maintaining security in its neighbourhood and thus the southern Mediterranean area. In the latter, as was pointed out by some EuroMeSCo reports that were presented in this report, distinctions between conflict prevention and other policies are rather blurred, and the issue as such is very often regarded as an instrument of national foreign and security policies rather than one of international cooperation and cooperative security. This is not to say that conflict prevention policies are opposed by southern Mediterranean partners, but, as was remarked in the reports, both the asymmetric security situation in the EU and the southern Mediterranean area and the different notions of security, and hence the existence of different security cultures North and South of the Mediterranean, must be made responsible for the little progress achieved so far.

To ameliorate and eventually diminish this gap, it is recommended to improve communication, as well as to create greater transparency as regards the substance of conflict prevention policies. As the acceptance of EU security policies in the southern Mediterranean and their implementation are dependent on their legitimacy and a close understanding and coordination with the regional partners, actions intended to introduce and strengthen ownership and co-ownership in relations and agreements have to become increasingly central in EU policies and thus more credible in the eyes of the southern partners.

Given that the recently adopted Action Plans under the ENP envisage consultations on conflict prevention, and in light of the fact that conflict prevention is almost always integrated in other policies, relevant Action Plans' consultations should be held not only on policies regarding direct actions of conflict prevention, but also on the conflict prevention dimensions involved in other policies. As a somewhat simultaneous step, it is being recommended to develop a training facility within the EMP that targets officials and desk officers that provides on a regular basis seminars and workshops on the multidimensional character of (EU) conflict prevention policies and how they can be utilised in the southern Mediterranean. This could lead to the development of a Euro-Mediterranean networking of sorts in the field of conflict prevention, a factor that is crucial to further developing and finally extending the existing EU conflict prevention culture.

## APPENDICES

### Research Teams and Topics

**Ownership and Co-Ownership in Conflict Prevention in the Framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.** This study was drafted under the auspices of the Swedish Institute for International Affairs (SIIA), Stockholm, and the Regional Center for Conflict Prevention (RCCP), Amman. It was written by Roberto Aliboni (IAI, Rome), Mohamed Salman Tayie (Cairo University), Reinhardt Rummel (CAP, Munich), Gunilla Herolf (SIIA, Stockholm) and Yassar Qatarneh (RCCP, Amman).

**Conflict Prevention in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.** This study is the result of a joint research project conducted by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome, and the Regional Center for Conflict Prevention (RCCP), Amman in the framework of the EuroMeSCo survey facility. The survey was conducted, and the final report written, by Roberto Aliboni (IAI) and Yassar Qatarneh (RCCP).

**Regional Security Dialogue and Cooperation in the South: Exploring the Neglected Dimension of the Barcelona Process.** This study was drafted under the auspices of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS), Tel Aviv, and the Groupement d'Études et de Recherches sur la Méditerranée (GERM), Rabat. It was written by Emily Landau (JCSS) and Fouad Ammor (GERM) and is particularly noteworthy as it is a function of the collaboration between two research institutes in the South, namely in Morocco and in Israel.

**Algeria, the Arab Maghreb Union and Regional Integration in North Africa.** This study is the result of a project conducted by Centre d'Études et de Recherches Internationales (CERI-Sciences Po), Paris, in collaboration with the Institut National des Études Stratégiques et Globales (INESG), Algiers in the framework of the EuroMeSCo survey facility. It was conducted during July and August 2006 and written by Luis Martinez (CERI-Sciences Po), with the support of Alexandra Paoli, Maria Rendon, Kamel Cheklat and Toumi Abdelkdev.

**Migrant Communities and the Internal and External Dynamics of Integration: The Potential Roles of Immigrants in the EMP.** This study was conducted by the Centre d'Études et de Recherches en Sciences Sociales (CERSS), Rabat, the Centre d'Études et de Recherches Internationales (CERI-Sciences Po), Paris, and the Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri), Paris. It was written by Christophe Bertossi (Ifri) and Mohamed-Ali Adraoui (CERSS).

**Women as Full Participants within the Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States.** This study was prepared at the behest of the European Commission as a contribution to the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial meeting on Gender Equality. It was co-ordinated by Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais (IEEI), Lisbon, and Abdallah Saaf (CERSS), Rabat, and written by Alexandra Barahona de Brito with the collaboration of Bárbara Direito

(IEEI) and the support of George Joffé, Cambridge University, Marie-Laure Cordara and Nadia Bentahar (IEEI). It is based on contributions from Fifi Benaboud, North-South Centre, Lisbon, Marit Flø Jørgensen, Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, Copenhagen, Nihad Abu Kumsan, Egyptian Center for Women's Rights, Cairo, Gema Martín Muñoz, Casa Árabe, Madrid, Rkia El Mossadeq, University of Fez, Noémia Pizarro, European Parliament, Brussels, Caridad Ruiz-Almodovar, University of Granada, Jamila Sayouri, Federation of support of reformation and local initiatives, Rabat, Tobias Schumacher (IEEI), and comments by Jill Donoghue, Institute of European Affairs, Dublin, Raffaella Del Sarto, European University Institute, Florence, Anitta Kynsilehto, Tampere Peace Research Institute, and Corinne André, University of Nantes.

**Mapping European and American Economic Initiatives towards Israel and the Palestinian Authority and their Effects on Honest Broker Perceptions.**

This study is the result of a joint project that was conducted by the Leonard Davis Institute at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC) in Malta and the Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri), Paris. It was written by Dorothée Schmid (Ifri), Shai Moses and Alfred Tovias (Leonard Davis Institute), and Stephen Calleya (MEDAC).

**The Adaptation of EU and US Democracy Promotion Programmes to the Local Political Context in Jordan and Palestine and their Relevance to Grand Geopolitical Designs.**

This study was conducted by the Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri), Paris, and the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), Amman, and written by Dorothée Schmid (Ifri), and Fares Braizat (CSS).

**Political Scenarios for the EU and its Neighbourhood – Views from Selected Southern Mediterranean and Eastern European Countries.**

This project was jointly conducted by the Institute for Public Affairs (IPA), Warsaw, and the Foreign Policy Institute (FPI), Ankara. The study was written by Piotr Maciej Kaczynski and Piotr Kazmierkiewicz (IPA), and Ali Tekin (FPI).

**Factors and Perceptions Influencing the Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Selected Southern Mediterranean Partner Countries.**

This study was conducted by the Turkish Economic and Social Sciences Foundation (TESEV), Istanbul, in cooperation with the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Hamburg. It was written by Sabiha Senyücel and Sanem Güner (TESEV), Sigrid Faath and Hanspeter Mattes (GIGA).

**Drawing Lessons From Spain's and Turkey's Security Sector Reforms for the Mediterranean.**

This study is the result of a joint research project conducted by the CIDOB Foundation, Barcelona, and the Turkish Economic and Social Sciences Foundation (TESEV), Istanbul. It was written by Eduard Soler i Lecha (CIDOB) and Debora Miralles i Solé (Catalan Patronate Pro Europe), Ümit Cizre (Bilkent University) and Volkan Aytar (TESEV).

**Political Liberalisation and Transition to Democracy: Lessons from the Mediterranean and Beyond: Morocco, Turkey, Spain and Portugal.** This study was conducted under the auspices of the Centre d'Etudes et des Recherches en Sciences Sociales (CERSS), Rabat, and the Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais (IEEI), Lisbon. Written by Alexandra Barahona de Brito, it benefited from contributions and comments from Abdallah Saaf (CERSS), Meliha Benli Altunisik (Middle East Technical University), Ankara, and Amel Boubekour and Samir Amghar (CEPS), Brussels, and Noha Antar (SWP), Berlin.

**Domestic Politics and Conflict in the Cases of Israel, Palestine and Lebanon.** This study is the result of a joint collaboration between the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome, and the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS), Beirut. It was drafted by Daniela Pioppi and Natalie Tocci (IAI), as well as Karam Karam (LCPS). It is based on four survey papers that were commissioned to regional experts focussing on domestic drivers of conflict in Israel (Ilan Pappé, University of Haifa), Syria (Salam Kawakibi, independent Syrian scholar), Palestine (Yazid Sayigh, King's College, London), and Lebanon (Karam Karam, LCPS).

**Islamist Parties in the Maghreb and their Connections with Europe: Growing Influences and the Dynamics of Democratization.** This study was conducted under the auspices of the Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, and the Centre d'Etudes et des Recherches en Sciences Sociales (CERSS), Rabat, in the framework of the EuroMeSCo exchange facility. It was written by EuroMeSCo exchange researchers Amel Boubekour and Samir Amghar who were hosted by the CEPS.

**The Muslim Brotherhood's Success in the 2005 Legislative Elections in Egypt: Reasons and Implications.** This study is the result of a joint project conducted by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin, and the Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies (ACPSS), Cairo, in the framework of the EuroMeSCo exchange facility. It was written by EuroMeSCo junior exchange researcher Noha Antar who was hosted by the SWP.

**The Political Integration of Islamist Movements through Democratic Elections: The Case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Hamas in Palestine.** This study was conducted under the auspices of the Al Ahram Center for Strategic Studies (ACPSS), Cairo, and the Royal Institute for International Affairs (RIIA), London, in the framework of the EuroMeSCo exchange facility. It was written by EuroMeSCo exchange researchers Amel Lamnaouer and Atef Abu Saif who were hosted by the ACPSS.

**Youth as Actors of Political Reform in the Southern Mediterranean.** This study was conducted by the Council of Europe's North South-Centre (NSC), Lisbon, in collaboration with the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS), Beirut, and written by Jamil Mouawad (LCPS) with the support of Gordana Berjan (NSC).

**The Nexus between Maghreb Migration and Security within the Context of the EMP: A Southern Perspective.** This study is the result of a joint project conducted under the auspices of the Regional Center for Conflict Prevention (RCCP), Amman, and the Association of International Studies (AEI), Tunis, in the framework of the EuroMeSCo exchange facility. It was written by EuroMeSCo exchange researcher Chahrazed Anane who was hosted by the RCCP.

**Turkish-Hungarian Relations with a Focus on Security Issues in the Euro-Mediterranean Area.** This study is the result of a joint project conducted under the auspices of the Téléki Lazslo Institute (TLI), Budapest, and the Foreign Policy Institute (FPI), Ankara, in the framework of the EuroMeSCo exchange facility. It was written by EuroMeSCo exchange researcher Muzaffer Senel.

**Benchmarking in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.** This study, written by Azzam Mahjoub (University of Tunis), was undertaken as part of the EuroMeSCo Rapid Response Facility in response to specific needs of the European Commission.

**Benchmarking Democratic Development in the Euro-Mediterranean Area: Conceptualising Ends, Means, and Strategies.** This study was also drafted in the framework of the EuroMeSCo Rapid Response Facility at the behest of the European Commission. It was written by Raffaella Del Sarto (EUI), Florence, Tobias Schumacher (IEEI), Lisbon, and Erwan Lannon (Ghent University) with the support of Ahmed Driss (University of Tunis).

**The Cartoons Crisis and Reactions in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.** This study is the result of a project conducted by IEMed, Barcelona, in collaboration with the Centre d'Etudes et des Recherches en Sciences Sociales (CERSS), Rabat in the framework of the EuroMeSCo survey facility. It was conducted during 2006 and written by Alain Blomart (University of Barcelona) on the basis of a questionnaire that was prepared by the IEEI and submitted to 17 experts.

**Getting it Right: Inclusion within Diversity – Lessons of the Cartoons Crisis and Beyond.** This report was prepared in response to a request by the European Commission as part of the EuroMeSCo Rapid Response Facility. It was co-ordinated and drafted by Álvaro Vasconcelos (IEEI, Lisbon), and is based on papers by Mustafa Akyol, Amr El-Shobaki (Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies, Cairo), Abdelali Hamidine (Université Abdelmalek Essaïdi, Tangiers), Ulla Holm (Danish Institute for International Affairs) and Rania Safar (IEEI, Lisbon), written contributions by George Joffé (Cambridge University) and Barbara Direito (IEEI, Lisbon), and texts prepared for the EuroMeSCo survey on the “cartoons crisis.”

## **Chronology of Main Events in the Euro-Mediterranean Area**

### **05.01.2006**

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon suffers a massive stroke and undergoes emergency surgery. Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is named acting Prime Minister.

### **25.01.2006**

Legislative elections take place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Hamas gains 74 out of 132 seats. Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei of Fatah resigns.

### **04.02.2006**

Throughout the Middle East, demonstrators protest against cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad in a negative light that have appeared in newspapers in several European countries.

### **05-06.02.2006**

The Danish embassies in Beirut and Damascus are torched during a demonstration against the cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad.

### **19.02.2006**

Hamas nominates Ismail Haniya as Prime Minister. As a reaction, Israel decides to withhold financial transfers destined for Palestine.

### **28.03.2006**

Parliamentary elections take place in Israel. The Kadima Party, headed by acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, wins 28 of 120 seats in parliament. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is appointed to form a coalition.

### **29.03.2006**

In the Palestinian Territories Ismail Haniya formally becomes Prime Minister.

### **25.04.2006**

Three bombs kill 30 people and wound 115 in the Egyptian resort town of Dahab. The attack coincides with the Sinai Liberation Day.

### **26.04.2006**

The EU Council of Ministers endorses the decision of the European Commission to temporarily put on hold assistance to or through the Palestinian Authority and its ministries.

### **06.06.2006**

The tenth Euro-Mediterranean Economic Transition Conference takes place in Brussels.



**10.06.2006**

In response to an Israeli shelling of a beach in the Gaza Strip that killed eight civilians, Hamas fires Qassam rockets into Israeli territory, ending the 16-month truce with Israel.

**25.06.2006**

Palestinian militants tunnel out of Gaza and into Israel, kill two Israeli soldiers and kidnap a third. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas condemns the attack and the kidnapping.

**25-26.06.2006**

The second Euro-Mediterranean ECOFIN Ministerial Meeting takes place in Tunis.

**27.06.2006**

The rivaling Palestinian movements agree on a plan calling for a Palestinian state alongside Israel, and call on militants to limit attacks to areas captured by Israel in 1967.

**29.06.2006**

Israeli troops seize political leaders of Hamas in the West Bank, including a third of the Palestinian cabinet and 23 legislators.

**12.07.2006**

Lebanese militant groups fire rockets into Israel, killing eight soldiers and kidnapping two others. In response, Israel launches a major military attack, bombing the Lebanese airport and parts of southern Lebanon.

**14.07.2006**

Israel blockades Lebanon and by attacking the airport in Beirut starts with the bombardment of Beirut and other sites in Lebanon. Throughout the conflict, Hezbollah continues to fire rockets into Israel.

**17.07.2006**

At the G-8 summit meeting in Russia, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan propose the deployment of an international force to stop the fighting in Lebanon. The European Commission provides 20 million EUR in food aid to the Palestinians.

**30.07.2006**

Israel suspends its air strikes on Lebanon for 48 hours.

**31.07.2006**

Israel resumes air strikes on Lebanon.

**01.08.2006**

More than 7.000 additional Israeli troops enter southern Lebanon.

**11.08.2006**

The Security Council of the United Nations agrees on a resolution to end violence in Lebanon. It votes unanimously to expand the UN peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon to 15.000 troops and to deploy another 15.000 Lebanese troops to support the UN soldiers.

**15.08.2006**

The ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon enters into force.

**21-22.09.2006**

The sixth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers for Industry takes place in Rhodes.

**24.10.2006**

The European Parliament and the Council of the EU adopt Regulation (EC) 1638/2006 laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument.

**07.11.2006**

Israeli troops end a Gaza Strip incursion after a six-day mission to stop Palestinians from firing rockets into Israel.

**14-15.11.2006**

The Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference entitled "Strengthening the Role of Women in Society" takes place in Istanbul.

**21.11.2006**

The Lebanese Minister for Industry, Pierre Gemayel, is assassinated in Beirut.

**27-28.11.2006**

The eighth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs takes place in Tampere.

**01.12.2006**

In Lebanon, members of Hezbollah and its supporters gather peacefully in Beirut and call for the resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora.

**16.12.2006**

Palestinian Leader Mahmoud Abbas calls for early elections expressing frustration with the growing violence between his Fatah party and Hamas.

## **EuroMeSCO Main Activities**

First Preparatory Meeting of the EuroMeSCo Annual Conference “The EMP Summit Conclusions in the Light of the Recent Events in the Mediterranean”, Brussels, 14 February 2006

EuroMeSCo Round-table “Women’s Rights and the EMP”, Lisbon, 13-14 March 2006

Second Preparatory Meeting of the EuroMeSCo Annual Conference “Migrants and their Communities as Actors of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, Paris, 24-25 April 2006

EuroMeSCo Steering Committee Meeting, Paris, 25 April 2006

Extraordinary EuroMeSCo General Assembly & EuroMeSCo Steering Group Meeting, Lisbon, 26 April 2006

Presentation of the EuroMeSCo Report “Women as Full Participants in the Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States” at the Senior Officials meeting, Brussels, 28 April 2006

EuroMeSCo Crisis-Management Seminar “Domestic Developments and Future Relations after the Palestinian and Israeli Elections”, Rome, 4 May 2006

EuroMeSCo Crisis-Management Seminar “The Cartoons Row”, Istanbul, 14-15 May 2006

EuroMeSCo Research Seminar “The Dynamics of Integration”, Istanbul, 15-16 May 2006

EuroMeSCo Research Seminar “Regional Security Challenges”, Rome, 7-8 June 2006

EuroMeSCo Research Seminar “Democratization and Human Rights”, Tétouan, 15-16 July 2006

EuroMeSCo-Senior Officials Meeting “Cultural Diversity and Fundamental Rights: What Common Agenda?”, Tampere, 20-22 July 2006

Third Preparatory Meeting of the EuroMeSCo Annual Conference “Civil Society, Human Rights and Democracy”, Meknès, 21-23 September 2006

EuroMeSCo Steering Committee Meeting, Istanbul, 5 October 2006

EuroMeSCo Steering Group Meeting, Istanbul, 5 October 2006

EuroMeSCo Annual Conference “Paths to Democracy and Inclusion within Diversity”,  
Istanbul, 5-7 October 2006

EuroMeSCo General Assembly, Istanbul, 7 October 2006

EuroMeSCo Crisis-Management Seminar “Algerian-Moroccan Relations”,  
Barcelona, 3 December 2006



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