

GUIDELINES FOR WORKING GROUP 1

Soft security risks in the EMP: Overcoming securitization

Friday, 27 June 2008

EuroMeSCo-IAI

“Security, Securitization and Reform: Back to Integrative Partnership”

2nd Preparatory Meeting in view of the 2008 EuroMeSCo Annual Conference;

Rome, 26-27 June 2008.

1. Home security in Europe is the combination of two policy frameworks: common endeavours, such as the EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Schengen area policies, on the one hand, and national policies, on the other. While Europe is under pressure to counter an important set of soft security factors through effective common policies and approaches, the interplay between the two frameworks – namely those of the EU and the member states – creates difficulties, with the result that policies remain largely uncoordinated.

- **In light of these developments, is an upgrading of the EU capacity required?**
- **More generally, how could EU integration be further strengthened in these sectors? What does the Treaty of Lisbon say about this issue?**

2. European responses to soft security risks from the Mediterranean and other neighbouring areas seem to be based, particularly after 11/9, on securitization trends. The EU’s Arab Mediterranean partners are complaining about this situation and see European policies as exclusive, rather than cooperative and based on dialogue. This is especially true with regard to immigration and the way this phenomenon is linked to terrorism. While the EU common space is supposedly built on justice and freedom, in the EU’s neighbourhood relations, however, these notions appear to be sidelined.

- **Is there a problem with the priorities being set at the EU level / within EU member states? Is there a need to rethink the relationship between security, terrorism, migration, and civil liberties?**
- **Does this problem stem from the multiplicity of national approaches? the weakness of the EU’s integrated approach? or both? Is there a need for truly integrated, and possibly more liberal, EU migration policies? Is such an objective attainable considering the role and priorities of EU member states?**
- **Are strategies of de-securitization in evidence?**
- **Are there differences between securitisation processes stemming from terrorism and those deriving from immigration?**
- **Are South Mediterranean governments only victims of the EU & EU members’ policies of securitization and externalization, or do they also benefit in some way from such policies?**
- **Is the principle of co-ownership, which in practice entails a stronger involvement of southern Mediterranean governments in Euro-Mediterranean relations, contributing to, or counter-balancing securitization trends?**

3. These policy trends negatively affect the European Neighbourhood Policy, seeing as it is tasked, among other things, to facilitate Europe’s fight against soft security risks and threats. Furthermore, because an important part of the ENP’s positive conditionality refers to the

implementation of the “four freedoms”, among which the freedom of movement of individuals between the EU and neighbouring countries may play a particularly crucial role.

- **What is the impact of the EU's character, institutional set-up, and border regimes on the ENP and its implementation?**
- **What is the impact of the EU's economic policies on the ENP and its implementation?**
- **Is there a relationship between EU economic policies towards 'the south' and the issues of security, particularly migration?**

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GUIDELINES FOR WORKING GROUP 2

Revisiting the reform perspective in Euro-Med relations

Friday, 27 June 2008

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1. Within the Euro-Med framework, Southern Mediterranean governments have rejected the EU’s reform and human rights agenda as an undue interference. This rejection became even stronger in response to US policies of democracy promotion. Most recently, the EU reacted to this attitude with a three-pronged shift: (a) from negative to positive conditionality; (b) from EU unilateralism to ownership; (c) from value-laden concepts of democracy to a search for a shared understanding on governance and on common rules.

- **Are EU responses acceptable? Are they effective with respect to the goal of promoting reform and the respect for human rights?**
- **Should political reform and human rights remain key elements of Euro-Mediterranean relations? Does the EU have clear objectives and strategies regarding the promotion of political reforms and the respect for human rights?**
- **Will democracy promotion policies necessarily remain subordinate to the objectives of 'stability' and (EU) 'security', or are these goals compatible?**
- **Are EU policies still based on the idea that economic liberalisation will inevitably lead to political reform in the southern Mediterranean?**

2. The EU’s democracy promotion approach seems to be based on two sets of policies: (a) political dialogue (conditionality, partnership, etc.) and (b) democracy assistance. EU democracy assistance programmes (directed towards governments, as well as civil society) have been criticized as insufficient and uncoordinated. It would appear that they did not live up to expectations.

- **Should the EU programme of democracy promotion rely less on political dialogue than on democracy assistance? Should democracy assistance be upgraded in any case?**
- **Which instruments of democracy assistance should the EU privilege?**

3. A number of Islamist political parties have expressed interest in democracy. Provision of support to such parties is widely regarded in well-informed EU public opinion as key to establishing stable forms of democracy and setting in motion democratic dynamics in Southern Mediterranean countries. The Carnegie Endowment’s research programme came to the conclusion that, while this interest in democracy is in many instances genuine, there are however “grey areas”.

- **Are Islamic parties a possible EU partner in encouraging democratic dynamics in the Southern Mediterranean countries? Should an EU opening to Islamist parties be based on specific principles and conditions, and if so, which ones?**
- **Are there any alternatives to developing a dialogue with governments on reforms?**

- **Which instruments are available to enhance interaction with democratizing Islamist parties?**
- **Are Europe's Muslim communities and even the issue of immigration in general, potential channels of communication with Islamist parties?**
- **In which ways is the dialogue on terrorism and immigration control that the EU is developing with governments of the region, compatible with evolving political relations with Islamist parties?**

4. The Union for the Mediterranean looks like an “apolitical” endeavour in which the role of the Commission, the EU, and civil society is expected to be either weak, or close to null. Yet in fact, the Union for the Mediterranean testifies to the growing role that national governments are playing in Euro-Med relations.

- **Would the addition of the intergovernmental Union for the Mediterranean to the Euro-Med constellation help promote reform and the respect for human rights, or will it simply allow governments on both shores of the Mediterranean Sea to escape that question?**

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